George Berkeley\u27s idealism: an examination of the idealist metaphysics and its connection to philosophy of mind by Powell, Joshua L.
University of Tennessee at Chattanooga 
UTC Scholar 
Honors Theses Student Research, Creative Works, and Publications 
5-2020 
George Berkeley's idealism: an examination of the idealist 
metaphysics and its connection to philosophy of mind 
Joshua L. Powell 
University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, joshpowell149@gmail.com 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.utc.edu/honors-theses 
 Part of the History of Philosophy Commons, and the Philosophy of Mind Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Powell, Joshua L., "George Berkeley's idealism: an examination of the idealist metaphysics and its 
connection to philosophy of mind" (2020). Honors Theses. 
This Theses is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Research, Creative Works, and Publications 
at UTC Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of UTC Scholar. 
For more information, please contact scholar@utc.edu. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
George Berkeley’s Idealism 
An Examination of the Idealist Metaphysics and its Connection to Philosophy of Mind 
 
Joshua L. Powell 
 
Departmental Honors Thesis 
 The University of Tennessee at Chattanooga  
Department of Philosophy and Religion 
 
Examined on March 30th, 2020 
 
 
 
Brian Ribeiro                                                                                Ethan Mills 
UC Foundation Professor of Philosophy                                     Assistant Professor of Philosophy 
Thesis Director                                                                            Department Examiner 
  
Abstract 
The prominent 18th century empirical philosopher George Berkeley espoused a 
philosophy known as “idealism.” This thesis aims to show that George Berkeley’s idealism is a 
formidable player in philosophy of mind. The present research unfolds his arguments for 
idealism as they appear in A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, turning at 
several points to The Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous for clarification. This 
research further explores the fundamentals of idealism in light of philosophy of mind, 
highlighting idealism’s intrinsic connection to this discipline. While this work is far from 
exhaustive, it provides the reader with essential information on Berkeley’s idealism and proves 
its worth as a philosophy in today’s world.  
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INTRODUCTION 
General Intro – Berkeley the Gadfly 
What does the philosopher do? Most professions are easy to pin down. If I say, 
“musician,” we are talking of someone that plays music. If I say, “sculptor,” we are talking of 
someone that sculpts. The English language is so exacting in this regard that we even have 
“arkwrights” – people that earn a living making wooden chests. Yet, if I say, “philosopher,” 
hardly anyone comes to a decisive definition. Some have tried – the Merriam Webster dictionary 
offers that a philosopher is “a person who seeks wisdom or enlightenment.”1 Even this effort 
begs the question. For starters, what is wisdom? What is enlightenment? What is it to seek them? 
I submit that the work of a philosopher does not define easily precisely because it relies on 
whom it describes for its features.  
In George Berkeley’s case, we find an archaic sort of philosopher on display, in the sense 
that the archetypally first philosopher called himself by a name that suits Berkeley very well. In 
Plato’s Apology, Socrates famously calls himself the “gadfly of Athens” – a gadfly literally being 
“any of various flies, as a stable fly or warble fly, that bite or annoy domestic animals.”2 
Reflecting Socrates’ discourse, the dictionary carries a second definition of the term: “a person 
who persistently annoys or provokes others with criticism, schemes, ideas, demands, requests, 
etc.”3 Contrary to the image of a stodgy school don in a robe, smoking a pipe in the corner, and 
generally looking like Gandalf on homestay, Berkeley actively engages with the thinkers of his 
own time. In fact, he is so good at engaging with his contemporaries that Berkeley’s philosophy 
lives in many cases primarily as a critique of his colleagues or predecessors.  
 
1 “Philosopher,” Merriam Webster Dictionary, accessed February 12, 2020, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/philosopher.  
2 “Gadfly,” Dictionary.com, accessed February 12, 2020, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/gadfly?s=t.  
3 “Gadfly,” Dictionary.com.  
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To pick a name that everyone knows, Berkeley criticizes Isaac Newton’s Principia, a 
book which, at the time, was in vogue among philosophers. Leaving out the particulars, notice 
the way that Berkeley introduces what he has to say about Newton: “…which distinction, as it is 
at large explained by the author, does suppose those quantities to have an existence without the 
mind: and that they are ordinarily conceived with relation to sensible things, to which 
nevertheless in their own nature, they bear no relation at all.”4 Berkeley’s Socratic roots show in 
his tactic with Newton. Berkeley’s critiques of contemporary and past philosophy are 
thoroughgoing and fascinating. Here I propose to consider George Berkeley the great gadfly of 
18th century philosophy.5  
Berkeley’s primary texts are famously quite short. The Penguin Classics edition of A 
Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge lasts a mere seventy-six pages.6 The 
Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous likewise endures only eighty-seven pages.7 It is 
my contention that idealism went out of style rather than was defeated; I believe that Berkeley’s 
idealism is a viable contender in the contemporary world of philosophy. In his book Mind, John 
Searle notes: “Idealism had a prodigious influence in philosophy, literally for centuries, but as far 
as I can tell it has been dead as a doornail among nearly all of the philosophers whose opinions I 
 
4 George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, in Berkeley: Philosophical Writings, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), Introduction ¶110. As we will see, one of Berkeley’s central tenets 
is that there are no objects or forces existing without the mind (or a mind, or a couple of minds… the intricacies of 
this view will be addressed later).  
5 See David Berman, “Berkeley’s Life and Works,” in The Cambridge Philosophy to Berkeley, ed. Kenneth P. Winkler 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 13-33 for an examination of scholarship on Berkeley’s life and 
works. His personal intellectual development is worth the read.  
6 George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, in George Berkeley: Principles of 
Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, ed. Roger Woolhouse (New York: Penguin 
Books, 1988), 31-113.  
7 George Berkeley, The Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, in George Berkeley: Principles of Human 
Knowledge and Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, ed. Roger Woolhouse (New York: Penguin Books, 
1988), 115-208.  
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respect, for many decades, so I will not say much about it.”8 In contrast to Searle, I think 
idealism more than holds its own in today’s intellectual space; the challenge is bringing the 
reader up to speed.  
Thesis Statement 
Here is my ultimate thesis: to show that idealism, when thoroughly investigated, remains 
a strong philosophical player, especially in philosophy of mind and self.9 In order to prove this, I 
will house the discussion primarily within (what is to me) his most important text, A Treatise 
Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge. I will investigate three selections of this work: 
the Introduction to the Principles, “Against the Existence of Matter,” and “Spirits and 
Epistemology.”10 Where necessary, I will make recourse to his work in the Three Dialogues 
between Hylas and Philonous, another of his principal writings. In discussing the Introduction to 
the Principles and “Against the Existence of Matter,” I will lay the foundations of idealist 
metaphysics. Beginning with “Spirits and Epistemology,” I will turn towards the claim that 
Berkeley’s idealism is a strong philosophical contender by speaking to its capabilities as a 
philosophy of mind and self. Ultimately, I will conclude in a cursory section on philosophy of 
mind that Berkeleyan idealism is far from dead – it as strong or stronger a contender than its 
chief competitors in the field.  
 
8 John Searle, Mind: a brief introduction (Fundamentals of Philosophy Series), (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2004), 47-48.   
9 I unfortunately do not have space to adequately address each party within the philosophy of mind to show that 
idealism holds its own in each case. I have chosen to show idealism’s superiority over Cartesian dualism because 
each prominent philosophy of mind today can do this (or at least attempts to) – I hope that in showing idealism’s 
similar ability, it will be manifest to the reader that, although not presently demonstrated, it is reasonable to claim 
that idealism is yet a lively, active contender in philosophy of mind.  
10 “Against the Existence of Matter” and “Spirits and Epistemology” are names of my own invention. I will clarify 
their proper purview under the heading “Discussion of the Main Text of the Principles.” 
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A TREATISE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN 
KNOWLEDGE 
INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES 
Introductory notes on the Introduction to the Principles 
In the introduction to The Principles of Human Knowledge, Berkeley makes a fascinating 
case concerning the difficulty and confusion that often surrounds philosophical discourse. 
According to my reading of the introduction, Berkeley makes twenty-five individual points. 
Some of these points are his general observations and others are substantive to his underlying 
argument. The references given throughout this section refer to the paragraph number in 
question.11 Where I have placed a letter next to the paragraph number (such as “¶2a”), this is to 
indicate which part of the paragraph I am referring to. Assume that I am referencing the 
introduction unless I state otherwise. Concerning the text itself, Berkeley starts us off in a very 
philosophically honest place with the observation that as soon as reasoning starts, scruples 
appear.12, 13 
Scruples and Berkeley’s take on them 
From the outset of any philosophical discussion, scruples are cropping up left and right. 
In today’s context, we hear it often in the classroom: Aristotle sees it this way, Hume sees it this 
way, and Locke sees it yet another way… scruples are omnipresent in philosophical discourse. 
 
11 Some authors (see, for example: Kenneth Winkler Berkeley and the Doctrine of Signs, in “Berkeley: Philosophical 
Writings” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 126.) use the word “section” in place of paragraph when 
speaking of Berkeley. I have chosen paragraphs to allow use of the paragraph symbol (¶). 
12 Berkeley, Principles, Introduction ¶1.  
13 This is Berkeley’s chosen word for disagreements, contentions, and generally not seeing something the same 
way as another. Fair warning: I am about to use the word scruples an annoying amount. Avoiding synonyms allows 
me to stay true to the wording in the paragraphs where he addresses the present subject.  
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Berkeley makes note of several common interpretations of the omnipresence of scruples. Some 
say that scruples are due to weakness of human minds; we just are not capable of seeing clearly 
enough to get beyond our scruples.14 Similarly, scruples could be the result of human finitude; 
we are relatively small beings, so we miss out on the grander elements in the reality of the 
world.15 Or yet, scruples could be the result of the misuse of our faculties rather than the 
incapacity of our faculties.16 For Berkeley, this third option (that scruples are the result of the 
misuse of our faculties) holds water.17  
In fact, not only does the third option hold water, Berkeley casts with it a very promising 
vision of human intellectual ability. We are capable of much better than these scruples, Berkeley 
says.18 To unravel our scruples, we need only find the head scruple-causer and eliminate it: for 
Berkeley, this is “the opinion that the mind has a power of framing abstract ideas or notions of 
things.”19 Berkeley’s primary evidence against the claim to the power of abstraction is that, in a 
word, you are always imagining something specific; or, what is the same thing, you are never 
imagining something abstract.20, 21  As Robert Fogelin puts it, Berkeley “is not simply arguing 
that we do not possess this or that particular abstract idea; his claim is generic. According to him, 
it is not in our power to form any abstract ideas whatsoever.”22 
 
14 Berkeley, Principles, Introduction ¶2a. 
15 Berkeley, ¶2b.  
16 Berkeley, ¶3a.  
17 Berkeley, ¶3b.  
18 Berkeley, ¶4. 
19 Berkeley, ¶6. 
20 Berkeley, ¶10.  
21 This claim (that you are always imagining something specific) is known as “particularism.” Berkeley, as will be 
shown momentarily, is quite a stringent particularist. 
22 Fogelin, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Berkeley and the Principles of Human Knowledge, (New York: 
Routledge, 2001), 108.  
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Abstract ideas and Berkeley’s take on them 
Now, this claim that the mind cannot form abstract ideas lacks a certain sort of colloquial 
sense. When I am in class and my teacher wants me to focus on the broader concept at play, she 
says to me, “think of this in the abstract.” Or, I will be in conversation and as a clarification will 
say that I am speaking abstractly, not just of this or that. The word abstract has a very welcome 
home in the English language – so, in what manner is Berkeley saying that we do not have the 
power of abstraction?   
Berkeley has a simple way of explaining himself. He has no desire to rid us of the 
common-sense notion that we can speak generally instead of specifically. His solution to the 
stated question is simple: general ideas exist, abstract ideas do not.23 Fogelin explains that by this 
point, it is clear that “Berkeley is thus faced with two tasks: the first, to produce decisive reasons 
for rejecting the doctrine of abstract ideas, the second, to give a satisfactory account of general 
terms in place of the abstractionist account.”24 Berkeley’s tactic is to prove that abstract ideas do 
nothing that general ideas do not; and, because (as will be shown) general ideas do not need 
abstraction to be explained, there is no reason to posit the existence of abstract ideas.  
One must distinguish at this point between the colloquial use of the word “abstract” and 
philosophical use of the word. Berkeley describes abstraction’s philosophical use in some length, 
and I think it is worthwhile to see the full selection. Here is the passage: 
“It is agreed on all hands, that the qualities or modes of things do never really exist each 
of them apart by it self and separated from all others, but are mixed, as it were, and 
blended together, several in the same object. But we are told, the mind being able to 
consider each quality singly, or abstracted from those other qualities with which it is 
united, does by that means frame to it self abstract ideas… Not that it is possible for 
colour or motion to exist without extension, but only that the mind can frame to it self by 
 
23 Berkeley, Principles, Introduction ¶12.  
24 Fogelin, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Berkeley and the Principles of Human Knowledge, 109.  
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abstraction the idea of colour exclusive of extension, and of motion exclusive of both 
colour and extension.”25  
Abstraction, in the philosophical sense, is not simply generalizing to talk about qualities 
that two or more entities share, although this is one important facet of it. Abstraction is also the 
ability to consider a single quality of a single entity exclusive of the entity’s other qualities. So, 
in the last sentence of the quotation, we see that “the mind can frame to it self by abstraction the 
idea of colour exclusive of extension,” etcetera. The abstractionist account of general terms is 
that if, for example, I saw an apple, I could abstract the apple’s redness and plug that redness 
back in when I notice that the cap on the bottle of Jamison whiskey is also red. Thus, in the 
abstractionist account, we come by general terms: pluck one quality out of the set of qualities 
composing one object and pluck the same (or a very similar) quality out of the set composing 
some other object. This gives us a “redness” which is not tied to any particular instantiation of 
the color red. Fogelin speaks of this as the ability to “abstract a ‘determinable’ distinct from any 
of its specific determinations.”26 He continues, “For example, presented with a variety of 
differing figures and magnitudes, the mind is supposed to be able to abstract a notion of 
something common to all, namely, extension.”27 By this process, we are able to speak generally 
of redness (and the same for all other qualities). The final way to abstract is that of “complex or 
compounded ideas” (Berkeley’s term). Fogelin simply quotes Berkeley’s explanation, and I will 
follow suit:  
“For example, the mind having observed that Peter, James, and John resemble each other, 
in certain common agreements of shape and other qualities, leaves out of the complex or 
compounded idea it has of Peter, James, and any other particular man, that which is 
peculiar to each, retaining only what is common to all; and so makes an abstract idea 
wherein the particulars equally partake, abstracting entirely from and cutting off all those 
circumstances and differences, which might determine it to any particular existence.”28 
 
25 Berkeley, Principles, Introduction ¶7.  
26 Fogelin, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Berkeley and the Principles of Human Knowledge, 109.  
27 Fogelin, 109.  
28 Berkeley, Principles, Introduction ¶9 
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To make a brief resume of Berkeley’s take on abstraction, we have three manners of 
abstraction: the ability to frame qualities exclusive of those with which they are presented to us 
(“the mind frames to itself by abstraction the idea of colour exclusive of extension…”), the 
ability to abstract to speak of general terms, and the ability to simplify a complex idea down to 
only those qualities shared equally by each similar complex idea. Recall from Fogelin that 
Berkeley has two jobs: to show that abstraction is false and to give a satisfactory account of 
general terms.29 The stage is set for Berkeley’s answer – which answer comes as a jumbled 
response to both of these tasks.  
Berkeley’s position is that mind is constantly moving to generalize and organize 
experiences but is engaged in so doing such that it neither abstracts a single quality exclusive of 
others, nor abstracts a single quality in order to speak generally, nor simplifies complex ideas to 
gain only the equally shared qualities. How so? As previously noted from ¶10, Berkeley endorses 
what is called “particularism,” or the theory of perception which says that no matter how hard 
you try to conceive of a single quality at a time, you must be conceiving of a single quality of a 
single entity.30 You can get particular, you can get specific, you can think with clarity about one 
certain aspect… of a certain thing. Here is the clincher: if that certain aspect is tied to that certain 
thing, it is always really a quality as it relates to the other qualities of the entity.  
Try it for yourself, says Berkeley: can you picture extension without thinking of 
something extended? Can you picture color without thinking of something colored? Can you 
picture motion without thinking of something moving? Of course not.31 Abstracts lack 
explanatory power; or, to put that in a more Berkeleyan way, abstracts exist only to cause 
 
29 Fogelin, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Berkeley and the Principles of Human Knowledge, 109. 
30 Berkeley, Principles, Introduction ¶10.  
31 Berkeley, ¶14.  
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scruples. As Fields notes, “The cause [of scruples] is not ‘the obscurity of things, or the natural 
weakness and imperfection our understanding’ ( PHKI 2), as Locke would have us believe, but 
rather abuse of language stemming from ‘the opinion that the mind hath a of framing abstract 
ideas or notions of things’ ( PHKI 6).”32 In short, if we want to move beyond mere philosophical 
bickering and scruples, we must lose the chief scruple-causer: the opinion that the mind has the 
power of framing to itself abstract ideas.  
Root of the error that is abstract ideas 
Now, Berkeley realizes that the power to form abstract ideas has a longstanding place in 
philosophy. His immediate predecessor, John Locke, makes a great deal of the power of 
abstraction, and so Berkeley is very often addressing himself against Locke. Nonetheless, it is 
not Locke that invented abstracted ideas; arguably, abstracts date to ancient Greek philosophy 
and well before. They are a common philosophical motif. This means that the burden of proof is 
on Berkeley to show why such a staple of the philosophical diet should be gotten rid of. In other 
words, how, if it is so false, did abstraction become so accepted? Answering this question gives 
us yet more of Berkeley’s argument against abstract ideas themselves.  
Berkeley pins the root of the error on the fact that language makes it seems as though 
abstract ideas must exist.33 The first mistake that philosophers make is thinking that each name in 
a language (chair, cat, car, guitar, lamp…) must have one unchanging, unaltering definition.34 
Furthermore, we have assumed that this unchanging definition denotes one idea, and the same 
idea, forever and without end. Keeping a single name (a noun) to a single definition (a group of 
words describing the noun) is good, necessary, and perfectly feasible. Keeping a single name to a 
 
32 Keota Fields, Berkeley: Ideas, Immaterialism, and Objective Presence, (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2011), 100.  
33 Berkeley, Principles, Introduction ¶18a.  
34 Berkeley, ¶18b.  
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single idea, however, is impossible.35 We have wrongly assumed that the only end of language is 
the communication of ideas, and so we wrongly assume that every significant name must stand 
for an idea.36, 37 Berkeley posits that the communication of ideas is not the only point of 
language.38 Words often garner results without conjuring up an intermediary idea.39 This is 
especially true (and obvious) in the case of familiar language.40  
Take the phrase “How is it going?” for example. I am not asking whether you are literally 
moving well, am I? I have not even defined the “it” that I am asking about, much less what I 
mean by this verb “to go.” Nonetheless, this question garners immediate results. If I ask you how 
it is going, you respond with, “well, my last exam was really difficult.” Or, “I love this cup of 
coffee!” Or, as a direct answer to the question, “It is going well.” This question is so vague that 
its purpose cannot possibly be to garner an intermediary idea with which I interact. This is 
Berkeley’s point  – especially in the case of familiar words and phrases, there is no conjuring of 
ideas occurring in the mind.41 There is no power of abstraction active during the process of 
communication; neither is it necessary to posit the power of abstraction to explain what is 
happening when language is in use. We very often go straight from hearing to doing without 
reflecting or inventing or considering (or, notably, abstracting) anything at all. Even when we do 
“abstract” in the colloquial sense, we are really making general ideas; and general ideas are not 
abstract ideas in the philosophical sense. Berkeley’s argument is that to posit the mind’s activity 
as being “abstraction” is to mutilate and overcomplicate basic linguistic interactions, and that 
 
35 Berkeley, Principles, Introduction ¶18c. 
36 Berkeley, ¶19a. 
37 Berkeley, ¶19b.  
38 Berkeley, ¶20a.  
39 Berkeley, ¶20b.  
40 Berkeley, ¶20c.  
41 Berkeley, ¶20.  
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where generalization is necessary, we are not talking about something that fits the given 
philosophical definition of an abstract idea anyhow.  
Returning to the question at hand, how is it that abstraction became so widely accepted if 
it is so evidently wrong? Berkeley maintains that language makes it appear that abstraction is 
necessary by virtue of our keeping a single name to a single a definition on the assumption that 
this definition marks out a single idea. Since one definition marking one idea is the would-be 
starting point of abstraction, and since this is not possible, abstraction never gets off the ground. 
Pretending that abstraction does get off the ground, abstraction still is not necessary to explain 
language and communication. There are two elements of language at play: the bit where we talk 
about general ideas and the bit where we go straight from word to action. We obviously do not 
need abstraction to explain the words-to-action bit; and the philosophical definition of abstract 
ideas does not fit the general ideas we employ in the other case. If we do not need the power of 
abstraction to explain language, then all this talk about abstraction being the ability to do such-
and-such a thing is both secondary to a mistake and not necessary. If what is secondary to a 
mistake must be wrong, and if what is not necessary is not necessary, then the opinion that the 
mind has power to form abstract ideas is out on all counts.  
Berkeley’s action plan, now that we know the problem with philosophy 
Fogelin summarizes that for Berkeley, “the commitment to abstract ideas has not only 
been nonproductive, it has been an actual source of error. The root error, for Berkeley, is the 
thought that we can form, through the power of abstraction, the idea of something existing that is 
neither a perceiver nor a thing perceived.”42 Fields writes that “by placing his attack on abstract 
 
42 Fogelin, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Berkeley, 113.  
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ideas in the introduction Berkeley intends to clear the reader’s mind of any lingering false 
principles in preparation for the philosophical arguments presented in the main text.”43 The 
question at this point is how we are to rid ourselves of the opinion that the mind has the power of 
framing abstract ideas. Berkeley’s suggestion is that if the old names for things are confusing (if 
our old philosophical terminology constantly makes us assume, like sliding into a rut on a dirt 
road, the power of framing abstract ideas), we should switch up our names and start again from 
top.44 The idea is that reworking our language, even given the difficulty of this project, is the 
proper way of dealing with abstract ideas.45 The work of discerning agreements and 
disagreements between one’s thoughts equals out to attentiveness to one’s own understanding.46 
In other words, here is our solution: we know that we have given bad definitions for words in the 
past. So, let us start with a new slate of words and pay sharp attention to our further use of these 
words to make sure we do not contradict ourselves and invent new errors or reinvent old errors 
by sliding back into the rut of abstract ideas.  
Conclusion to discussion on the Introduction 
Berkeley finishes his Introduction to A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human 
Knowledge with an appeal to the reader. If the reader wants to understand what Berkeley is about 
(namely, what follows in the main text of the Principles), then the reader must make himself 
think the sorts of thoughts that Berkeley had to think in the way that Berkeley had to think them 
for him to conclude that his idealism paints the right picture of our experiences.47 This appeal 
 
43 Fields, Berkeley: Ideas, Immaterialism, and Objective Presence, 100.  
44 Berkeley, Principles, Introduction ¶21.  
45 Berkeley, ¶22a.  
46 Berkeley, ¶22b.  
47 For an interesting discussion of why Berkeley must be read so carefully, consider Fogelin’s treatment of the 
simple term “idealism.” A.A. Luce, a premier Berkeley scholar, considers Berkeley an “immaterialist” instead of an 
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makes good sense given Berkeley’s solution to the problem of thinking that the mind has the 
power to frame abstract ideas. He is asking you not merely to think hard and do good 
philosophy; he is asking you to first take the philosophy you already know and toss it to the side 
such that you can start fresh with new terminology and from this point examine and explain the 
world marked out by your experience.  
“AGAINST THE EXISTENCE OF MATTER” 
Introductory notes on “Against the Existence of Matter” 
In “Against the Existence of Matter,” Berkeley makes twenty-nine individual points. As 
in the introduction to the Principles, some of Berkeley’s points make contributions to his overall 
argument and some are more like observations or evidences to demonstrate his propositions. As 
this pseudo-title title implies, “Against the Existence of Matter” is orchestrated to prove that 
materialism, and the concept of matter more generally, is false. It seems to the reader during the 
greater part of this selection that Berkeley assumes he is proving idealism right by proving 
matter false. This is problematic because idealism is not the unique alternative to a matter-only 
view; he could just as well say that he proves property dualism true. In ¶15, however, Berkeley 
explains precisely what he thinks he is proving in this section. He is arguing that if we are good 
empiricists, holding tightly that knowledge comes in by the senses, then to prove that no sense of 
ours can tell whether extension or color exists in an outward object is to prove that neither 
extension nor color exist outside the mind. Understanding this aim of Berkeley’s will help guide 
the discussion that precedes this conclusion in his text.  
 
idealist for the reason that so many misunderstand idealism. Berkeley, even with this admonition to the reader, is 
often misread. See both Fogelin, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Berkeley and the Principles of Human 
Knowledge, Routledge (New York: 2001), 31 and the first chapters of Roberts, A Metaphysics for the Mob: The 
Philosophy of George Berkeley (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).  
P a g e  | 14 
 
Taxonomy of objects of human knowledge 
So, then, to a walkthrough of “Against the Existence of Matter.” Berkeley’s first move is 
to give us a taxonomy of human knowledge. This is an immense claim because Berkeley is 
specific about this being a complete taxonomy; no object of human knowledge is left out of this 
classification system. Note well that this is a taxonomy of the objects of human knowledge. The 
fact that Berkeley is speaking of the objects of human knowledge (rather than speaking of human 
knowledge itself) becomes critically important when he later makes the claim that he is for 
“turning ideas into things, not things into ideas.”48, 49 Bear in mind that Berkeley’s preferred 
word for ‘objects of human knowledge’ is ‘ideas.’ Jump ahead to “Difference between 
knowledge of ideas and knowledge of spirits” under “Spirits and Epistemology” for discussion 
on the importance of these objects of human knowledge as pertains to their being ‘ideas’ in 
juxtaposition to ‘spirits.’ 50 Berkeley writes in ¶1 of the Principles,  
“It is evident to anyone who takes a survey of the objects of human knowledge, that they 
are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses, or else such as are perceived by 
attending to the passions and operations of the mind, or lastly ideas formed by help of 
memory and imagination, either compounding, dividing, or barely representing those 
originally perceived in the aforesaid ways.”51 
Berkeley gives us the three types or categories of objects of human knowledge. These 
categories of the objects of human knowledge play a critical role in developing the Berkeleyan 
metaphysics. They are also rather difficult to understand on a single pass. As such, I will address 
them in one sense presently and will return to them in a more robust way later – specifically, I 
 
48 Berkeley, Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, in “Berkeley: Philosophical Writings” (Cambridge: 
Cambridge, 2008), pg. 225. 
49 I grant that this may be only a difference in terms (human knowledge vs. objects of human knowledge). In any 
case, Berkeley’s phrasing becomes paramount in understanding his metaphysics. So, even if there was no 
difference in fleshed-out meaning between the alternatives, the second phrasing is significantly more Berkeleyan 
for its plug-and-play connection with the wording of his overall metaphysics.  
50 See also Tom Stoneham, “George Berkeley: A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge,” in 
Central Works of Philosophy Vol. 2: Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Chesham: Acumen Publishing Limited, 
2005), 141-142.  
51 Berkeley, Principles, Main Text ¶1. 
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will return to the categories of the objects of human knowledge and interpret them in light of 
other passages in the discussion of “Spirits and Epistemology.” For now, consider that one 
(admittedly incomplete) way of seeing the distinction between the objects of human knowledge 
is in terms of “avoidability.” The first type is unavoidable; the second type is avoidable if you 
fail to reflect; and the third type is avoidable or not, depending on rather arbitrary factors.  
1st-category objects of human knowledge 
In what sense is the first type of object of human knowledge unavoidable?  These 
knowledge objects are “ideas actually imprinted on the senses.”52 These are the sensations that fit 
the normal bill for the term “sensation:” I stub my toe and say ouch. This type of knowledge 
object comes entirely from outside of the individual; they are, in Berkeley’s words, “imprinted” 
onto the perceiver’s senses. If this were baseball, knowledge objects of the first variety would be 
like a ball that hits you square on the jaw. Whether you wanted to catch it with your jaw, whether 
you saw it coming, whether you tried to get your glove up… none of this really matters: the fact 
is that you got slugged by a baseball. Answer me this: can you, in the pure power of your 
volition, avoid the sensation of a broken jaw?  
2nd-category objects of human knowledge 
The second type of knowledge object is avoidable if you choose not to reflect on the 
sense data you are receiving (read: if you choose to not intellectually engage with the first-
category knowledge objects coming in through the senses). Berkeley says that these second-
category knowledge objects are “such as are perceived by attending to the passions and 
operations of the mind.”53 This second type of knowledge object is more avoidable than the first 
in view of the fact that I choose whether to pay attention to the “passions and operations of the 
 
52 Berkeley, Principles, Main Text ¶1.  
53 Berkeley, ¶1.  
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mind.” If we continue with the previous example, where in playing a game of baseball you get 
clocked in the jaw, then the process of procuring these second-category knowledge objects is 
akin to deciphering who threw the baseball and when. If you chose not to think about it, you 
would not be confronted with the objects of human knowledge that are the ideas of the cause and 
timing of your getting hit by the baseball. The critical difference between first and second-
variety knowledge objects is in the fact that you must pay attention to what passes in your mind 
to receive the second (something like the mental effort involved in finding out who threw the ball 
and thinking about the timing of when they threw it) and that you have nothing much to do with 
choosing whether you feel the ball connecting with your jaw. Although it varies from situation to 
situation, the presence of this second type of object of human knowledge is mostly under the 
control of my volition.  
3rd-category objects of human knowledge 
The third type of knowledge object is best described in terms of its being within oneself 
and its being sometimes willed, sometimes unwilled. These, Berkeley says, are “ideas formed by 
help of memory and imagination.”54 These knowledge objects are sometime ephemeral, 
sometimes long-lasting. Berkeley intends with this category to capture all of those slightly-less-
than-real thoughts that we entertain; memories, intuitions, fears, pains, and emotions belong to 
this category of knowledge object. Bear in mind that the third type of knowledge object is not the 
result of deep thinking or reasoning; those belong to the second type. The third category 
knowledge objects do not necessarily accord with the time in which they are being had, neither 
are they always under the control of the person that has them. Perhaps it is best to think of it like 
this: there are knowledge objects coming directly from sensation due to input from without 
 
54 Berkeley, Principles, Main Text ¶1. 
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oneself (first category knowledge objects). There are also knowledge objects coming directly 
from mental operations of one kind or another due to any variety of inputs both from without and 
within oneself. There is a variety of these mental operations which belong to deep thinking and 
intense reasoning – these are the second category knowledge objects. The rest of the knowledge 
objects coming from mental operations belong to the third category of knowledge object.  
Rendering the differences between categories of knowledge objects 
It is important to clearly render the difference between these categories of objects of 
human knowledge. If confused, they will cause serious problems down the road – this will 
become clearer in the discussion of “Spirits and Epistemology.” The first category stands distinct 
from the second two because knowledge objects of the first category come from without the 
individual whereas these come from within. Knowledge objects of the second two categories 
come from a sort of reflection on other knowledge objects.  
Not one of these objects (whether first, second, or third category) is more of a knowledge 
object than the next; however, there is a degradation of epistemological reliability that occurs the 
further one gets from knowledge objects coming from without the self (first category). The 
second category is absolutely essential because it interprets and infuses meaning into mere 
sensation. The third category is less epistemologically real than both of the others because it is 
neither knowledge objects relating to your experience (first category) or knowledge objects 
resulting from reflection on your experience or your memories and imaginations (second 
category). It is, rather, your memories and your imaginations; your knowledge objects 
concerning what happened in the past (whether accurate or not) and your knowledge objects 
considering what could be in the future or just is in your mind (whether accurate or not). As 
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mentioned already, this is an incomplete description of the objects of human knowledge. This 
discussion picks up again in greater detail in “Spirits and Epistemology.”  
Equality of the terms mind, soul, self, spirit 
After giving us this taxonomy of knowledge objects, Berkeley moves on to define his use 
of the term “mind.” More often than not, Berkeley speaks to “spirits” instead of “minds” or 
“souls.” Here in ¶2, Berkeley equates all of these terms: “mind” is equal to “soul,” “spirit,” and 
“self.”55 This is important in light of how many philosophies contain a distinction between mind 
and spirt or differentiate mind from soul. For Berkeley, all of these terms indicate the same: 
mind, self, soul, spirit… these are identical in Berkeley’s philosophy.   
Esse is percipi, epistemological empiricism 
Notice that at this point in the Principles, Berkeley is writing in a system-building mode. 
He is giving definitions of terms and patching together the groundworks of idealism… he is, in 
short, building up the idealist metaphysics. Possibly the most well-known phrase from this 
system-building section is “esse is percipi,” which many take to be the central point of 
Berkeleyan idealism. 56 Berkeley begins Principles ¶3 with the remark that no matter how 
blended or jumbled-up, “the various sensations or ideas imprinted on the sense… cannot exist 
otherwise than in a mind perceiving them.”57 Grayling remarks, “From these claims it follows 
that the gap between things and ideas vanishes. If things are collections of qualities, and qualities 
are sensible ideas, and sensible ideas exist only in mind, then what it is for a thing to exist is for 
it to be perceived – in Berkeley’s phrase, to be is to be perceived: esse is percipi.”58  
 
55 Berkeley, Principles, Main Text ¶2.  
56 Berkeley, ¶3. Esse is percipi is an odd combination of Latin (esse and percipi) and the English verb “to be.” 
Translated literally, this phrase reads, “to be is to be perceived.”  
57 Berkeley, ¶3. 
58 A. C. Grayling, “Berkeley’s Argument for Immaterialism,” in The Cambridge Companion to Berkeley, ed. Kenneth 
P. Winkler (New York, Cambridge University Press: 2005), 169.  
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One erroneous way to take Berkeley’s meaning is to assume that he is limiting the 
domain of actually existing things to the scope of an individual’s perception. Such that, were I to 
leave the room I am in, I could not say that the table continues to exist. Berkeley is not making 
this claim! In fact, he is claiming much the opposite. Just before using the phrase “esse is 
percipi,” Berkeley speaks of the table in his study. How might one say that the table exists? 
Berkeley responds, “The table I write on, I say, exists, that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out 
of my study I should say it existed, meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, 
or that some other spirit actually does perceive it.”59  
This sets up a rhetorical question, the answer of which highlights Berkeley’s theistic 
roots. How can the table continue to exist, if esse is percipi, when no individual perceives it? 
Berkeley replies in ¶6 that either the table must not exist when no one is looking, or else it must 
“subsist in the mind of some eternal spirit.” The reason that an object is still there when I am not 
looking (and neither is anyone else) is that God himself constantly perceives and maintains his 
creation – this is the distinctly Christian bent of Berkeley’s philosophy. The grounding of reality 
as we know it is not some external matter; no, the grounding of reality, the thing which makes X 
still there when no one is looking, is God – the eternal spirit in whose mind subsist all things.  
Notice also that this quotation highlights what we might call Berkeley’s “epistemological 
empiricism.” How do we mean when we say that the table exists? Do we mean that it has certain 
qualities? Do we mean it has a certain shape? Do we mean it is built of a certain type of stuff? 
According to Berkeley, what we mean is that we perceive it.60 Existence (“to be,” or esse) is 
determined by perception (is “to be perceived,” or percipi). If X is being perceived, this indicates 
 
59 Berkeley, Principles, Main Text ¶3.  
60 Berkeley, ¶6.  
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that X must be existing. The critical component is that our way to determine whether a thing 
exists is rooted in determining whether it is being perceived or not.61  
Self-knowledge issue at heart of B.’s metaphysics 
Branching from the claim that to be is to be perceived, one must ask whether Berkeley 
considers all existing thing to be perceived things. Roberts confirms “that the being of sensible 
things consists in their being perceived.”62 Yet, as already seen in ¶2, Berkeley speaks to things 
which exist (spirits) which are not objects of human knowledge (ideas). Speaking to the 
synonyms spirit, soul, and oneself, Berkeley writes, “By which words I do not denote any one of 
my ideas, but a thing entirely distinct from them, wherein they exist, or, what is the same thing, 
whereby they are perceived.”63 In ¶27, Berkeley defines “spirit” as “one, simple, undivided, 
active being.” In ¶33, he defines real things as the ideas imprinted on the senses. In ¶142, 
Berkeley clarifies that, “Spirits and ideas are things so wholly different that, when we say ‘they 
exist,’ ‘they are known,’ or the like, these words must not be thought to signify any thing 
common to both natures.” If ideas are the sort of stuff that an individual might know, and “spirit” 
is specifically, decidedly, and by nature not of this stuff, then presumably there should be no 
knowledge of spirits. If the rationale for the existence of things without the mind is that their 
existence is justified and defined by the mind’s perception of them, then we should only be able 
to speak of things existing without the mind. Grayling writes of this issue as it appears in the 
Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, “The nub of the problem is that if we are 
acquainted only with our own perceptions, and never with the things which are supposed to lie 
 
61 As will be seen later, Berkeley makes hay out of the fact that nothing you perceive can simultaneously be 
unperceived… and thus nothing can exist outside the purview of perception. This is addressed in “Difference 
between knowledge of ideas and knowledge of spirits” under “Spirits and Epistemology.” 
62 John Russel Roberts, A Metaphysics for the Mob: the Philosophy of George Berkeley (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), 5.  
63 Berkeley, Principles, Main Text ¶2.  
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beyond them, how can we hope for knowledge of those things, or even be justified in asserting 
their existence?”64 
In fact, the problem is graver even than this. Back in ¶2, Berkeley tells us that mind, 
spirit, self, and soul are one and the same. If we simply swap our words out and restate the issue, 
we get this startling revelation: if ideas are the stuff of what a perceiver can know, and if the self 
is specifically, decidedly, and by nature not of this stuff, then we can have no knowledge of the 
self. This problem (the second problem deriving from the second error made in considering “esse 
is percipi”) is of critical importance to Berkeley’s philosophy – if Berkeley fails on this count, 
then his metaphysics contains within itself the means of its own defeat.65  
The question stands thusly: is there a way to remedy the discord between Berkeley’s 
description of mind-external objects and his overall metaphysics? For now, it is best to leave this 
question as it is and continue with our discussion of the main text of the Principles. I will return 
to this question in the section on “Spirits and Epistemology” because answering to the issue of 
self-knowledge in Berkeley’s metaphysics requires analysis of “Spirits and Epistemology” and 
several selections from The Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous.  
Locke, primary and secondary qualities 
In answer to the question of how perceiving external things equates to them being ideas, 
Berkeley begins in ¶10 and ¶11 a very interesting argument concerning the inseparability of 
primary and secondary qualities of objects and how the relationship between these qualities 
reflects upon the being of the objects in question themselves. The assertion from his opponents 
 
64 A. C. Grayling, “Berkeley’s Argument for Immaterialism,” 167.  
65 For outside proof that Berkeley is not the only philosopher to have trouble with issues of self-knowledge, see 
Wright, Crispin, “Self-Knowledge: the Wittgensteinian Legacy,” Current Issues in Philosophy of Mind, Royal Institute 
of Philosophy Supplement 43, ed. Anthony O’Hear (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 101-122. For an 
extended treatment of the history of philosophy of self-knowledge, see Ursula Renz (ed.), Self-Knowledge: A 
History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).  
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(notably John Locke) is that one must make a distinction between the primary and secondary 
qualities of an object. The primary qualities of an object are those that exist in the external object 
itself, namely, solidity (or bulk), motion, and extension (or shape).66 Secondary qualities are 
mind-dependent qualities, such as color, taste, or the sharpness of a sound.67 Nadler notes, “Thus, 
while primary qualities really belong to objects, secondary qualities (at least as we know them) 
are merely the effects in the mind of the object's own primary qualities and of the bulk, texture, 
and motion of the insensible parts of which the object is composed.”68, 69 
The inseparability argument (of primary and secondary qualities) 
The crux of the issue for Berkeley is that if one can prove that primary qualities always 
go together with secondary qualities, and secondary qualities only exist in the mind, then primary 
qualities must also exist only in the mind. Berkeley recognizes the limitations of what he is about 
to argue. He is not proving that primary qualities do not exist in some external matter.70 Rather, 
he is proving that, if our criteria for the realness of something is tied to our epistemic access to it, 
then our inability to explain primary qualities as distinct from secondary qualities (which he 
holds himself to have proved in the preceding paragraphs) entails that external objects, just like 
their supposed primary qualities, must be mental.71 Nadler summarizes that “close examination 
 
66 Hylarie Kochiras, “3.1 Tension in Locke’s Thought,” in “Locke’s Philosophy of Science,” The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy (Spring 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/locke-philosophy-science/>.  
67 Berkeley takes these secondary qualities likewise from Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. 
Reference section 3.2.1 of Kochiras’s article (given in footnote 66 above).  
68 Steven Nadler, “Berkeley’s Ideas and the Primary/Secondary Distinction,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 20, 
no. 1 (1990): 49, accessed March 15, 2020, https://www.jstor.org/stable/40231683.  
69 See Daniel Flage, “Notes and discussions Berkeley’s Principles, section 10,” Journal of the History of Philosophy; 
Baltimore 41, no. 4 (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2003), 544. Flage discusses how Berkeley, in 
targeting the primary/secondary quality distinction, implicitly rejects the causality hypothesis (where primary 
qualities cause secondary qualities). There is not space to discuss it here, but it is a fascinating outrigger of 
Berkeley’s argumentation.  
70 Berkeley, Principles, Main Text ¶15.  
71 Berkeley, ¶15. 
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reveals that the same or equally strong arguments can be used to prove either set of qualities 
‘mind dependent.’ Since these two sets together comprise all the possible properties of a body, 
bodies are thus reducible to collections of sensible qualities, all similarly in the mind of some 
perceiver.”72 
Fogelin calls this Berkeley’s “inseparability argument” because it relies centrally upon 
the logic that if A only exists in X place, and B never appears except in conjunction with A, then 
B must only exist in X place. In this case, B’s only existing in X place means that the one type of 
thing (primary qualities) which would necessitate external matter (as the stuff in which primary 
qualities reside) exists only in the mind. And if these primary qualities exist only in the mind, we 
have no room to posit that objects external to the mind exist. Fogelin frames it in the following 
way: 
“We recognize intuitively that things of type A are inseparably united with things of type 
B in the sense that we cannot so much as conceive of them existing independently. If it is 
further acknowledged that things of type A cannot exist otherwise than in a mind, then, as 
the reasoning goes, it must also be acknowledged that things of type B cannot exist 
otherwise than in a mind.”73 
The importance of this argument is that by it, Berkeley shows the explanatory 
unnecessity of matter and, thereby, gives impetus to idealism. There is a slight problem with 
Berkeley’s argumentation, however. Berkeley is attempting to position himself contrary to 
Lockean materialism, which means Locke would have to be claiming that secondary qualities 
exist only in the mind for Berkeley’s argument to hold sway against him. As Fogelin notes, 
Locke does not take this view! Rather, “Locke held that secondary qualities do exist in objects, 
though only as powers to produce certain sensations in us.”74 How, then, can Berkeley take 
himself to have made a positive advance if the materialist position against which he is arguing 
 
72 Nadler, “Berkeley’s Ideas and the Primary/Secondary Distinction,” 47.  
73 Fogelin, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Berkeley and the Principles of Human Knowledge, 55.  
74 Fogelin, 55. 
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does not fall subject to his axiomatic distinction between secondary and primary qualities? One 
possible conclusion is that we should throw out Berkeley’s argument because he commits this 
seeming ad hominem fallacy against Locke. For my own part, I think that ¶11 alleviates this 
tension and allows us to keep Berkeley’s argument.  
Doc. of abstract ideas founded on concept of mind-independent qualities 
In ¶11 of the Principles, Berkeley makes a fascinating argument correlating the idea of 
primary or secondary qualities existing in some external matter to the doctrine of abstract ideas. 
He reasons that qualities like “great and small, swift and slow are allowed to exist no where 
without the mind, being entirely relative, and changing as the frame or position of the organs of 
sense varies.”75 In a word, Berkeley is claiming that at least some subset of the qualities that all 
philosophers recognize are seen on all hands as belonging only to the mind. Berkeley continues 
to reason that if these qualities (like greatness or smallness, swiftness or slowness) exist only in 
the mind, then “the extension therefore which exists without the mind is neither great nor small, 
the motion neither swift nor slow, that is, they are nothing at all.”76 So, then, what must this 
extension and motion be which exists without the mind in some external matter? They must be 
“extension in general, and motion in general; thus we see how much the tenet of extended, 
moveable substances existing without the mind depends on that strange doctrine of abstract 
ideas.”77  
The point of the eleventh paragraph is none other than to show that the Lockean concept 
of anything (much less some category such as primary or secondary qualities) existing without 
the mind rests upon what Berkeley calls the “doctrine of abstract ideas.” This is the same 
 
75 Berkeley, Principles, Main Text ¶11. 
76 Berkeley, ¶11.  
77 Berkeley, ¶11.  
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doctrine he holds himself to have overcome in the Introduction to the Principles. In other words, 
the ¶11 illustrates that there is no ad hominem fallacy occurring in the ¶10, provided that 
Berkeley was right in the Introduction to the Principles and has, in fact, defeated the Lockean 
contention for the doctrine of abstract ideas.  
In Principles ¶91, Berkeley makes much the same point. Richard van Iten summarizes 
Berkeley’s work there in the following words: 
“First, he has delivered the final blow to the doctrine of abstract general ideas, along with 
its "hidden" Platonism. This much is accomplished by the introduction of (Q) Qualities 
must inhere in a substance. Second, he has arrived at idealism. The pattern followed in 
arriving there can be sketched as follows. After eliminating material substance and 
analyzing sensible objects as congeries of qualities, Berkeley invokes (Q). This leaves 
him with one alternative, i.e., sensible objects must inhere in a mind (mental 
substance).”78 
This theme is common among Berkeley’s writings: that after abstract ideas go, idealism comes 
in. As van Iten illustrates, this is precisely because the existence of mind-independent matter 
rests upon the doctrine of abstract ideas and, once the throwing out of that doctrine is combined 
with the necessity of qualities to inhere in a substance (Q), the only appropriate substance is 
mind.  
Denial of unity’s status as abstract idea 
In Principles ¶12, Berkeley moves on to one final contention for the doctrine of abstract 
ideas. Some philosophers, he alleges, claim that unity is a simple idea. In this context, “simple” 
is meant to indicate that unity, in the fashion of Locke’s abstract ideas, can be conceived in 
exclusion of its normally attendant qualities. Berkeley counters that unity, just like the greatness 
and smallness or fastness and slowness from the inseparability argument in ¶10, changes with a 
person’s perspective.79 Is the unity of a single meter the same as the unity of a single foot? No – 
 
78 Richard J. van Iten, “Berkeley’s Analysis of Mind,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 24, no. 3 
(International Phenomenological Society, 1964), 376.  
79 Berkeley, Principles, Main Text ¶10. 
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they differ by a notable amount. Even more obviously: is the unity of a single gallon the same as 
the unity of a single yard? Of course not. Although there is obviously a quality which each of 
these shares (the quality of being “one” of something), there is nothing more than this general 
sharing of a quality. Each unity is a unity of something particular, even more obviously, 
Berkeley claims, than is extension or motion.  
By the same argument as in the Introduction to the Principles, this indicates that although 
we recognize unity in multiple cases, the thought that this necessitates an abstract “unity” which 
they all share is a trick of language; we have no abstract concept of unity. As Jesseph concisely 
puts it, “The most general characterization of Berkeley’s philosophy of mathematics identifies it 
as a denial of abstractionism.”80 At each step, here including even philosophy of mathematics, 
Berkeley denies the doctrine of abstract ideas as presented in the Introduction to the Principles. 
In showing that even unity is mind-dependent, Berkeley demonstrates again that there is nothing 
– and really nothing – that exists independently of mind.  
Circumspection on defeating abstract ideas 
Having shown that nothing exists independently of the mind, Berkeley circumspectly 
gives us his conclusion on the matter. Using extension and color as his example of qualities 
supposed to exist in external matter, he asserts in ¶15 that he has proven not that there is no 
extension or color in an outward object, but that our senses tell us nothing of an object’s true 
extension or color.81 This conclusion hits home on Berkeley’s epistemological empiricism. If we 
remain true to the epistemological empiricism which Berkeley endorses in ¶3, then the fact that 
our senses tell us nothing of an object’s true extension or color (meaning its extension or color as 
 
80 Douglas M. Jesseph, “Berkeley’s Philosophy of Mathematics,” in The Cambridge Companion to Berkeley, ed. 
Kenneth Winkler (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 277.  
81 Berkeley, Principles, Main Text ¶15.  
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they exist in some external matter) indicates that there is no such thing as mind-independent 
matter.82 
Master Argument: conclusion of “Against the Existence of Matter” 
 Berkeley concludes “Against the Existence of Matter” with what scholars have called his 
“Master Argument.” In ¶22-23, “Berkeley gives a version of what has comes to be called ‘The 
Master Argument’ because of the apparent strength with which he endorses it.”83 The axe of this 
argument is that mind-independent objects cannot be conceived of – and what cannot be 
conceived of, based on Berkeley’s epistemological empiricism, cannot be said to exist. The court 
length of the Master Argument is telling of how much stock Berkeley puts into this argument. 
Although Berkeley gives the Master Argument in ¶22-23 of the Principles, he retells it more 
interestingly in the Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous. In order to dissect the 
argument, we will turn presently to the second of these dialogues.  
The Master Argument in the Second Dialogue 
The Master Argument gets at the question of whether perception is fundamental to an 
object’s reality. Imagine, if you would, a tree in an open field. Does this tree exist independent of 
your perception?  In the personage of Philonous (the quasi-Berkeley character), Berkeley asks 
rhetorically: “How say you, Hylas, can you see a thing which is at the same time unseen?”84 
Hylas responds that this is a contradiction; of course you cannot simultaneously see a thing and 
have that thing be unseen. Philonous then jumps from seeing to conceiving, saying, “Is it not as 
great a contradiction to talk of ‘conceiving’ a thing which is unconceived?”85 He continues, 
 
82 Berkeley, Principles, Main Text ¶3.  
83 Lisa Downing, “2.2.1 The Master Argument?” in “George Berkeley,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Spring 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/berkeley/>. 
84 Berkeley, Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, in “Berkeley: Philosophical Writings” (Cambridge: 
Cambridge, 2008), pg. 182 
85 Berkeley, 182.  
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“And what is conceived is surely in the mind… How then came you to say, you conceived a 
house or tree existing independent and out of all minds whatsoever?”86 The ultimate conclusion 
to the Master Argument comes only a paragraph further down the same page. Berkeley writes in 
the voice of Philonous, “You ought not therefore to conclude that sensible objects are without the 
mind, from their appearance or manner wherein they are perceived.”87 Lisa Downing notes that 
there are several authors who have picked apart Berkeley’s argument on the claim that he 
conflates our representation of a thing with the thing itself. Thus, in the argument she cites from 
Pitcher’s work, Berkeley’s Master Argument fails because it ignores the difference between that 
which is our representation of a tree and that tree itself.88 I find Pitcher’s critique to be very 
unsatisfying because it ignores Berkeley’s underlying critique of representationalism. Berkeley’s 
very point is that there is no verifiable difference between the supposed actual tree in the field 
and our supposed representation of the tree – an appeal to the senses simply confirms that we 
have an idea of the tree and, further, that we have never conceived of an unconceived tree 
(because this is a manifest contradiction). Therefore, on grounds of his epistemological 
empiricism, Berkeley is justified in making the claim that nothing exists “independent and out of 
all minds whatsoever.”89  
Returning to Berkeley’s iteration of the Master Argument in the Principles, we see that 
he makes the same point as in the Dialogues. In this case, he gives the example of trees in a park 
and books in a closet. “But say you,” he writes in ¶23 of the Principles, “surely there is nothing 
easier than to imagine trees, for instance, in a park, or books existing in a closet, and no body by 
to perceive them.” Berkeley sets the stage to look as though objects easily exist alone and 
 
86 Berkeley, Dialogues, 182.  
87 Berkeley, 182.  
88 Downing, “2.2.1 The Master Argument?” in “George Berkeley,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.  
89 Downing, “2.2.1 The Master Argument?”  
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unperceived. Yet, not so fast, Berkeley reasons: “But, do not you yourself perceive or think of 
them all the while? This therefore is nothing to the purpose; it only shows you have the power of 
imagining or forming ideas in your mind.” Claiming that one conceives of something 
unperceived does nothing to support the claim that mind-independent objects exist. “To make 
this out,” Berkeley writes, “it is necessary that you conceive them existing unconceived or 
unthought of, which is a manifest repugnancy.”90 
In the first paragraph of my commentary on the Master Argument, I wrote that the axe of 
the argument is that you cannot conceive of mind-independent objects. How so? One cannot 
perceive of mind-independent objects because to perceive an object is precisely to prove its mind 
dependency! Since every object which you perceive is mind-dependent, and since there is 
therefore no proof for any unperceived objects, the following must hold: we have no ground to 
claim that there is such a thing as mind-independent matter. The Master Argument concludes 
Berkeley’s thoughts in “Against the Existence of Matter.” His next task in the Principles is to 
address a long string of possible objections to his idealism. For us, the next stop is at ¶135-156 
and the turn to the subject of spirits and epistemology.  
“SPIRITS AND EPISTEMOLOGY” (Or: Philosophy of self and other minds) 
Introductory notes on “Spirits and Epistemology” 
My tactic concerning “Spirits and Epistemology”91 is somewhat different than that for 
“Against the Existence of Matter” and the introduction to the Principles. It is best in this section 
to follow a topical, rather than exegetical, approach. Berkeley’s work in “Spirits and 
Epistemology” centers around one simple question: can I have knowledge of spirits? In the 
 
90 Berkeley, Principles, Main Text ¶23.  
91 Remember that this is my title for ¶135-156 and not Berkeley’s, although I am not alone in recognizing these 
paragraphs as a defined section of the Principles – see also Cummins, 191.  
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subsection, “Self-knowledge issue at the heart of B.’s metaphysics,” I promised a further 
exploration of the subject of self-knowledge and the knowledge of other spirits.92 This is a 
tenuous issue for Berkeley because of his strict definitions of the objects of human knowledge in 
¶1 of the Principles. Rephrased briefly, Berkeley’s problem is that he has robustly distinguished 
between spirits (which are active, thinking beings – PHK ¶27, 135, 138, 139, et al.) and ideas 
(which are passive and derive existence only from being perceived – PHK ¶25, 27, 33, 139, et 
al.). Cummins notes that “the material which precedes the metaphysical/religious finale, Sections 
135 through 145, considers chiefly the consequences of the sharp contrast between minds and 
ideas, which was introduced in Section 2 and expanded in Section 27.”93 As Berkeley makes 
perfectly clear in ¶25 and ¶27 especially, spirits perceive ideas – and ideas are so unlike spirits 
that they cannot even resemble them. “Minds are not sensibles,” writes Cummins, “and cannot 
be represented by them or their images, because the only thing like an idea is an idea, and the 
two are utterly unalike.”94 One must get at spirits somehow in a philosophy that makes such a big 
deal of them – for Berkeley, spirits are essential because they are the sole substance and 
grounding of ideas.95 If he cannot get at them (spirits) by having an idea of them, then it must be 
that we have some sort of knowledge (but no direct ideas) of spirits. Berkeley rejects the 
“implied major premise” of the unlikeness of minds and ideas that “the only knowledge is 
knowledge of or through ideas.”96 This begs the question: how does one have knowledge of 
 
92 Recall that for Berkeley, self-knowledge and knowledge of others concern knowledge of spirits because he 
equates spirit with mind, soul, and self.  
93 Phillip D. Cummins, “Berkeley on Minds and Agency,” in The Cambridge Companion to Berkeley, ed. Kenneth 
Winkler (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 191.  
94 Cummins, 192.  
95 Not to mention the fact that on Berkeley’s view, you are a spirit – and so it would be rather odd indeed if you 
had no knowledge of spirits.  
96 Cummins, “Berkeley on Minds and Agency,” 192.  
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spirits? What type of knowledge does one have of spirits? Let us examine these questions 
closely.  
Difference between knowledge of ideas and knowledge of spirits 
First, the most pressing question in its broadest form: how does Berkeley tally the need to 
have knowledge of spirits and the inability of ideas to resemble spirits? I think the best entry into 
Berkeley’s answer is to pretend for the time being that we can have knowledge of spirits. If we 
make this pretension, then there is a critical follow-up question: does my knowledge of spirits 
(either of my own soul, of someone else’s soul, or of both if it is the same kind of knowledge) 
differ in kind from my knowledge of ideas? Berkeley answers with a stout yes – the knowledge 
of spirits is not the same as the knowledge of ideas.97  
The logic is that spirits have ideas, not more spirits – the claim being that ideas and spirits 
are so vastly and perfectly unalike that if ideas are what a spirit “operates about” (Berkeley’s 
wording from ¶27 PHK), then a spirit most obviously cannot operate about spirits. Here is 
Berkeley’s way of making the same point in ¶135 PHK, “I shall here add that a spirit has been 
shown to be the only substance or support, wherein the unthinking beings or ideas can exist. But 
that this substance which supports or perceives ideas should be it self an idea, or like an idea, is 
evidently absurd.” So far, Berkeley is very clear: ideas and spirits are perfectly unalike, ideas 
being passive and deriving their existence from being perceived by spirits and spirits being the 
substance of ideas and deriving their existence from perceiving and thinking.98  
Here’s the snag: how are we then speaking and reasoning about spirits? After all, if ideas 
are what the mind operates about (¶27 PHK), if we are operating about something when speaking 
presently of spirits, and if spirits are absolutely not ideas, then how are we speaking of spirits? 
 
97 Berkeley, Principles, Main Text ¶135. 
98 Berkeley, ¶139.  
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How, if the objects of all varieties of human knowledge are ideas, and spirits are not ideas, do we 
gain a place from which to have knowledge of spirits? The short answer is the concession that 
we are indeed only ever speaking of ideas. Berkeley makes it obvious that no matter what subject 
we approach, we are operating about ideas – not spirits.99 Even if we say the word spirit, we are 
still working with an idea. Berkeley sees that this is problematic; spirits are essential to his 
metaphysics. The first step to expanding the answer to this issue stems from edits Berkeley 
makes in Principles ¶27, ¶138, and ¶140.  
Of all the edits that Berkeley makes in the second edition of the Principles, these are the 
most important. His edits are almost completely devoted to clarifying how and in what sense we 
have knowledge of spirits. The most important change is in his use of the term “notions.” In the 
1710 edition of the Principles (1st edition), he used notions and ideas interchangeably. Look, for 
example, at the last phrase of ¶138 in the 1710 edition: “… it is evident there can be no idea or 
notion of a spirit.” In the 1734 edition, he omits the words “or notion,” paving the way for a new 
use of the term in ¶140, where he adds the term notion in the 1734 edition. Here is how the first 
sentence of ¶140 reads in the 1734 edition: “In a large sense indeed, we may be said to have an 
idea or a notion of spirit.” So, by the 1734 edition, notion has become the technical term for the 
knowledge that one has of spirits. As to a technical definition, notions appear to be some kind of 
inferred ideas. This definition is corroborated and expanded in the 1734 edition (3rd edition) of 
the Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous. 100   
 
99 Berkeley, Principles, Main Text ¶135 and ¶139.  
100 Reference Daniel Flage, "Berkeley's Notions.” Flage argues along similar lines, pulling heavily from the 
philosopher Thomas Reid to construct an interpretive paradigm of Berkeley’s notions based on Reid’s distinction 
between direction and relative conception.  
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Defending view that Berkeley has two fundamental categories of knowledge 
Using Berkeley’s now-established terminology, we can say that we have two kinds of 
knowledge: ideas and notions. Berkeley’s use of the term idea in this sense causes some 
confusion. In “Spirits and Epistemology”, Berkeley equivocates the term idea to mean on the one 
hand, “the information one gets directly from sense perception” and on the other hand, “any of 
the processes which one does notice or could notice in one’s mind.” In large brush strokes, 
Berkeley’s play is to conflate these definitions such that literally any subject of one’s attention, 
no matter its’ origin, is to be called an idea. I think that Berkeley makes this all-are-ideas point 
and sticks to it – meaning that he equivocates by accident, not design, and his argument should 
be given the benefit of the doubt. The problem is that in a section like “Spirits and 
Epistemology,” where he distinguishes the two definitions to nuance his epistemology in order to 
talk of spirits, he reuses the word idea and juxtaposes it to the word notions. This gives us the 
mixed message that at once all human knowledge is composed of ideas and some human 
knowledge is composed of notions, which are like vaguer ideas. For Berkeley’s system to 
function, we must have both ideas (the first definition) and notions (the second definition) and 
we must have each of these as types or versions or forms of the objects of human knowledge. It 
needs to look something like this: 
1) We have objects of human knowledge 
2) These could be ideas (direct knowledge) 
3) These could be notions (inferred knowledge) 
These types of knowledge, whether direct or inferred (2 or 3), are equally composed of these 
objects of human knowledge (1), which objects must fall into one of the three categories of 
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human knowledge given in Principles ¶1. Defending this view as Berkeley’s own requires us to 
look outside of the Principles by turning to The Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous.  
Defending knowledge objects dichotomy from Dialogues 
As stated above, the most fundamental paradigm of knowledge is that each object of 
human knowledge (while all being equally objects of human knowledge) is of one of two sorts of 
knowledge: directly sensed knowledge or inferred knowledge.101 Here is my present thesis: while 
every object of human knowledge falls into the taxonomy of the objects of human knowledge 
from PHK ¶1, the distinction between directly sensed and inferred knowledge comes logically 
prior to it.  
I hold this to be the case for three reason. First, the primacy of the position of the 
argument for an inferred versus directly sensed knowledge distinction in the text of the 
Dialogues. It is the very first argument that Philonous makes as proof for idealism. This tells us, 
if nothing else, that Berkeley esteems this argument highly. Second, Berkeley publishes three 
editions of the Dialogues (where this argument figures prominently in dialogues one and two) 
and two editions of the Principles (where this argument figures notably in PHK ¶27, ¶80, ¶140, 
¶142, and as backdrop for “Spirits and Epistemology” generally). If nothing else, the number of 
times he edits and republishes versions of this argument should tell us how important it is to his 
own thinking. Third, the taxonomy of the objects of human knowledge (PHK ¶1) functions well 
 
101 See Flage, “Berkeley’s Notions,” 409 for support of this interpretation. Despite a difference in wording between 
my own interpretation and Reid’s, this central tenet holds true: there are two kinds of knowledge, one of them 
stemming from direct sense perception and the other stemming from inference, or what Reid calls relative 
conception.  
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if it is logically preceded by the directly sensed versus inferred knowledge distinction, but not 
vice versa.102  
In order to support my three claims, we must first examine the argument in question. 
Beginning on page 157, Philonous (the quasi-Berkeley personage) begins arguing with Hylas 
(the quasi-materialist/skeptic personage) over the causes of things.103 Hylas, being the quasi-
materialist, takes the Lockean position on primary versus secondary qualities. Just as in the 
Principles, Berkeley argues against the position that there is mind-independent matter (or 
substance) in which qualities (such as texture, color, sound, and shape) subsist. In the guise of 
Philonous, Berkeley presents several example scenarios designed to pry open the issue of what is 
directly sensed versus what is inferred, and specifically what this tells us about the question of 
the existence of mind-independent matter.  
Philonous first presents the question in a standardized form. He asks, “Are those things 
only perceived by the senses which are perceived immediately? Or, may those things properly be 
said to be ‘sensible’ which are perceived mediately, or not without the intervention of others?”104 
Philonous is in the process of critiquing Hylas’s concept of sensible things. Hylas just defined 
sensible things as “those things which are perceived by the senses”105 – but this definition needs 
clarifying in Philonous’s view. What does Philonous’s two-pronged question intend to clarify 
about Hylas’s definition of sensible things? It aims at prying Hylas back from claiming that 
things discovered by way of inference are sensible things. This is the route to the error that there 
 
102 I take this to mean that the directly sensed/inferred distinction is prior to the taxonomy of the objects of human 
knowledge because neither characterization of knowledge functions if flipped the other way around. My rationale 
is the principle of charity – it seems it must work this way or else his system is rather rough-shod.   
103 Berkeley, Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, 157. Unlike the Principles, Berkeley does not give us 
established paragraph numbers in the Dialogues. As such, the references I give will refer to the page numbers in 
this Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy edition of Berkeley’s collected works. For reference: this edition 
begins the first dialogue on page 151.  
104 Berkeley, 157. 
105 Berkeley, 157.  
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is mind-independent substance, Berkeley insinuates. To clarify his concern, Philonous gives an 
example concerning a person reading a book. “In reading a book, what I immediately perceive 
are the letters; but mediately, or by means of these, are suggested to my mind the notions of God, 
virtue, truth, &c. Now, that the letters are truly sensible things or perceived by sense, there is no 
doubt; but I would know whether you take the things suggested by them to be so too.”106 
Here, as in the Principles, Berkeley uses the term “notions” to describe the sort of 
knowledge that one has of things determined by inference rather than by direct sensation. In this 
case, it is the “notions of God, virtue, truth, &c.” The letters on the page are sensible things, and 
therefore are ideas (they are on the directly perceived side of the dichotomy between inferred and 
directly sensed knowledge). The concepts (or, to use Berkeley’s technical term, the notions) 
insinuated by these letters on the page are real objects of knowledge – only, they are not objects 
of knowledge by the same fashion as the letters themselves. Hylas admits that Philonous has 
made a good point and agrees that sensible things are “those only which can be perceived 
immediately by sense.”107 Elsewhere, Berkeley cleanly equates sensible things with ideas (ideas 
in the sense of the word within the inferred/directly perceived knowledge distinction).108 
Philonous carries on with his argument: “Does it not follow from this, that though I see one part 
of the sky red, and another blue, and that my reason does thence evidently conclude there must 
be some cause of that diversity of colours, yet that cause cannot be said to be a sensible thing, or 
perceived by the sense of seeing?”109  
Philonous is already starting to make the grander point at play. The axe of his argument is 
not just that sensible things are of a certain sort – his argument aims to prove that the causes of 
 
106 Berkeley, Dialogues, 157.  
107 Berkeley, 157.  
108 Berkeley, Principles, Main Text ¶25.  
109 Berkeley, Dialogues, 157. 
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sensible things are not themselves sensible things. He is not doing so in a generalized or purely 
conceptual way, either. The example is quite practical. Look at the sky during sunset and pay 
attention to its colors. The reds, the burnt oranges, the deep purples and hazy blues… we directly 
perceive the color of the sky, but the cause of its color? We never perceive the cause of the color 
because the cause of a sensible thing is not itself sensible! Philonous sharpens his point with 
another example: “In like manner, though I hear [a] variety of sounds, yet I cannot be said to 
hear the causes of those sounds.”110 Now in the voice of Hylas, Berkeley gives the conclusion to 
this argument:  
“I tell you once for all, that by ‘sensible things’ I mean those only which are perceived by 
sense, and that in truth the senses perceive nothing which they do not perceive 
immediately, for they make no inferences. The deducing therefore of causes or occasions 
from effects and appearances, which alone are perceived by sense, entirely relates to 
reason.”111  
Sensible things are those things directly perceived by sense.112 Things directly perceived 
by sense are ideas.113 We see here that Berkeley is making a fundamental claim about human 
knowledge: at rock bottom, humans have knowledge of two kinds – directly sensed knowledge 
(“…by ‘sensible things’ I mean those only which are perceived by sense…”) and inferred 
knowledge (“…The deducing therefore of causes or occasions from effects and appearances, 
which alone are perceived by sense, entirely relates to reason.”). At the outset of this section, I 
alleged to prove that the distinction between directly sensed and inferred knowledge comes 
logically prior to Berkeley’s tripartite taxonomy of the objects of human knowledge in ¶1 of the 
Principles. In fact, the method by which this dichotomy fits prior to the Principles ¶1 trichotomy 
is rather simple.  
 
110 Berkeley, Dialogues, 157.  
111 Berkeley, 158. 
112 Berkeley, 158. 
113 Berkeley, Principles, Main Text ¶158.  
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Fitting Dialogues dichotomy with Principles trichotomy 
The first two categories of the objects of human knowledge in PHK ¶1 are: “ideas 
actually imprinted on the senses” and “such as are perceived by attending to the passions and 
operations of the mind.”114 These two categories seem familiar, do they not? Here, Berkeley is 
using “idea” in the conflated sense I mentioned a few paragraphs back – where he means at once 
“the information one gets directly from sense perception” and “any of the processes which one 
does notice or could notice in one’s mind.” These two definitions map directly onto these first 
two categories of the objects of human knowledge! 115  Where does the third category of the 
objects of human knowledge fall? It seems to me that in the PHK ¶1 trichotomy, Berkeley is 
attempting to get at a nuance within the way that we perceive our own mental operations. There 
are mental processes which generally map onto the external world like passions (love, hate, fear, 
etc.) and operations (willing, deciding, reasoning, etc.). There are also mental processes which 
do not cleanly correspond to anything happening in the world outside of us, at least not at the 
time at which these processes are occurring. Memory (re-conjuring past operations and passions, 
etc.) and imagination (considering possible operations and passions, and ways things could 
change or be altered in the external world, etc.) both fall into this category.  
Whether Berkeley has a well-reasoned rationale for breaking up the dichotomy of the 
Dialogues into the trichotomy of the Principles, I am not sure. Commentators on Berkeley have 
expressed a variety of opinions.116 Perhaps he saw a pressing need to insist on the distinction 
between types of mental processes – the reasons why are not clear. In interpreting the trichotomy 
 
114 Berkeley, Principles, Main Text ¶1 
115 See E. J. Furlong, “An Ambiguity in Berkeley’s ‘Principles,’” Hermathena, no. 94 (Trinity College Dublin: July 
1960), 84-102. The two common schools of thought regarding Berkeley’s trichotomy of human knowledge objects 
are that of Professor T. E. Jessop and A. C. Fraser. I side with Professor Jessop.  
116 Furlong, 85-86.  
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of Principles ¶1, Furlong takes note of entry 775 in Berkeley’s Philosophical Commentaries, a 
collection of Berkeley’s personal notebooks. Furlong writes, “The entry, and the deletion it 
contains, show him to be restricting ideas to the two kinds, namely, ideas of sense and ideas of 
imagination – roughly, sense data and mental images.”117   
Terminology to repair Berkeley’s “idea” equivocation 
The real confusion in Berkeley’s writings is this unfortunate equivocation on the term 
“idea” – if he had used separate terms to indicate the objects of human knowledge (the stuff of 
which all human knowledge is composed) and the things that constitute directly perceived 
knowledge (the narrow sense of “idea” constituting directly sensed knowledge as juxtaposed to 
the “notions” constituting inferred knowledge, or Furlong’s “mental images”), his writings 
would be much clearer.118 It seems to me that, when parred down to the most fundamental level, 
the trichotomy of PHK ¶1 is nothing more than a restatement of the dichotomy for which 
Berkeley argues in the Dialogues. I propose that from this point forward, in order to clarify 
which definition of idea I am using, the conflated, categorical version of the term (meaning any 
subject of one’s attention, no matter its’ origin – what Berkeley calls the objects of human 
knowledge) is to be called idea OHK (OHK indicates object of human knowledge) and the narrow 
version of the term (meaning exclusively the objects of human knowledge gained from direct 
sense perception) is to be called idea DSK (DSK indicated directly sensed knowledge). To restate 
for clarity: idea OHK is the genus defined as the objects of human knowledge. Ideas DSK and 
notions constitute the two species of the genus ideas OHK.  
 
117 Furlong, “An Ambiguity in Berkeley’s ‘Principles,’” 91-92.  
118 Furlong, 91-92.  
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Returning to the Q of self-knowledge 
Where does this leave us with the problem of self-knowledge? Can one have knowledge 
of spirits? I hope it is becoming obvious at this point why Berkeley answers with such a 
resounding yes in the “Spirits and Epistemology” section of the Principles. The issue as stated 
before is how, if the objects of all varieties of human knowledge are ideas, and spirits are not 
ideas, we have knowledge of spirits. This issue exists only because Berkeley equivocates the 
term idea to his own detriment. Allow me to restate the question using the clarified terms idea 
OHK and idea DSK. How, if the objects of all varieties of human knowledge are ideas OHK, and 
spirits are not ideas OHK, do we have knowledge of spirits? The question has become a non-
sequitur; the fact that the objects of all varieties of human knowledge are ideas OHK and the fact 
that the term spirit is not identical with the term idea OHK do not play into the question of the 
knowability of spirits, just as it would not if we replaced spirits in this question with ideas DSK. 
The question of spirits or ideas DSK not being identical with ideas OHK has no input into the 
question of our having knowledge of spirits or ideas DSK. From the very giving of the dichotomy 
of human knowledge in the Dialogues, Berkeley has answered this sort of question. We can have 
knowledge of directly sensed things (ideas DSK being the objects of directly sensed knowledge) 
and knowledge of inferred things (spirits being the objects of inferred knowledge)119 
Two outstanding questions 
There are two connected outstanding questions concerning Berkeley’s claim that we can 
have knowledge of the causes of things.120 First, how certain are we that Berkeley’s argument 
(that we have inferred knowledge, which type of knowledge is of the causes of things) proves 
that the causes of things are not material? Berkeley has certainly proved that there is something 
 
119 Remember that for Berkeley, causes, spirits, minds, and soul are all equivalent terms! 
120 Or what is the same thing, that we can have knowledge of minds or spirits.  
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which stands a step behind our ideas DSK and he has certainly proved that we have knowledge of 
that something-a-step-behind (by inference). How does Berkeley safeguard himself from having 
accidentally lent equally as much weight to the materialist position as to his own idealism? To 
put it another way, does Berkeley adequately ensure that his argument will not drag-and-drop 
into the materialist logic for the something-behind being mind-independent matter? Second, how 
certain are we that Berkeley allows himself room to argue for spirits or minds as the substance of 
ideas? He has argued extensively against the idea that there is material substance behind the 
qualities that we perceive on the grounds that one cannot directly sense this material 
substance.121 It seems as though he must backtrack to make the claim that there is a substance 
behind our ideas, even if he changes the character of that substance to some degree. Cummins 
notes the key paragraphs as ¶26 and ¶49 of the Principles.122 In ¶26, Berkeley employs the term 
“spiritual substance” to support his idealism. In ¶49, Berkeley seems to deny the existence of any 
spiritual substance.123 Does Berkeley contradict his own logic by at once arguing against the 
grounding of sensible qualities in a substance and arguing for a substance behind sensible 
qualities? Let us tackle these questions individually.  
First outstanding question 
Berkeley is positing that spirit is the only substance and that ideas are moved, altered, 
changed, invented, and even destroyed by spirits.124 If Berkeley is on board with the proposition 
that there is something behind the ideas that we perceive, how can Berkeley conclude that this 
 
121 See ¶10 and ¶11 of the Principles, “The inseparability argument” above, and Fogelin, Routledge Philosophy 
Guidebook to Berkeley and the Principles of Human Knowledge, 55.  
122 Cummins, “Berkeley on Minds and Agency,” 214-215.  
123 He seems to deny the existence of any spiritual substance in ¶49 in order to distance himself from the 
accusation that he is contradicting himself by arguing against the materialist’s substance while simultaneously 
positing another type of substance.  
124 See Berkeley, Principles, Main Text ¶3, ¶25, ¶28, and ¶139. 
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something is not mind-independent matter? Berkeley’s defense is that he has already defeated 
the notion of abstract ideas. If the argument against abstract ideas succeeds, and Berkeley is right 
that something has got to be behind sensible qualities, then we are left asking what kind of a 
thing meets these criteria. The “thing behind” must be active (since it cannot be an idea, and 
ideas are by definition passive) and it must not necessitate the process of abstraction (although, 
one should recall that generalizing is still an option – refer back to the discussion of the 
Principles’ introduction). For Berkeley’s part, the only type of thing meeting both criteria is 
spirits.   
In summary, Berkeley’s argument for spiritual substance would only work as a plug-and-
play argument for material substance if he had not laid out these two accompanying criteria: that 
the substance of ideas must be active and it must not rest on the doctrine of abstract ideas. 
Granted, this answer is only satisfactory if Berkeley’s argument against abstract ideas works. It is 
apparent from the Principles that Berkeley thinks he has soundly defeated abstract ideas.125 If 
Berkeley’s argument against abstraction succeeds as he thinks it does, then he is in perfect 
position to answer the critic who demands why his move for spiritual substance is not 
hypocritical with regards to his attack on material substance.  
Second outstanding question 
The best answer to the second outstanding question starts with a look at Berkeley’s words 
in ¶26 and ¶49. In ¶26, Berkeley begins by noting the constant “succession of ideas” that 
confronts us. He reasons that “there is therefore some cause of these ideas whereon they depend, 
and which produces and changes them.”126 This cause of ideas cannot itself be an idea or a 
 
125 See Berkeley, Principles, Main Text ¶22 and ¶23, “Master Argument: conclusion of ‘Against the Existence of 
Matter’” above, and “2.2.1 The Master Argument?” in Downing, “George Berkeley,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy.  
126 Berkeley, Principles, Main Text ¶26. 
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combination of ideas; in ¶25, Berkeley made this point very clear. If this cause of ideas cannot be 
an idea or a combination of ideas, then it must be a substance.127 “But,” Berkeley writes, “it has 
been shown that there is no corporeal or material substance; it remains therefore that the cause of 
ideas is an incorporeal active substance or spirit.”128 In ¶49, Berkeley answers an objection to 
idealism based on the relationship between qualities and substance. The problem for Berkeley is 
that qualities inhere in their substance – and as Cummins show, this is a serious problem for 
Berkeley in that spirit is supposed to be immortal and cannot, therefore, take on a quality like 
extension.  
“On the traditional doctrine of substance, a quality’s name is or can be predicated of any 
substance in which it inheres. Thus the objection portrays Berkeley as holding the 
qualities that make up sensible objects inhere in the mind that perceives them, in which 
case their names are to be predicated of that mind. This result would commit Berkeley to 
extension, figure, and motion being predicated of the mind, a very embarrassing result for 
a philosopher who insists again and again that the mind is unextended and who is anxious 
to secure the natural immortality of the soul on the basis of its unextendedness.”129  
So, how does Berkeley rectify the need to have a substance as the support of ideas (PHK 
¶26) and his need for the mind to not take on the qualities which it somehow supports (PHK 
¶49)? Here is the question as Berkeley words it: “It may perhaps be objected, that if extension 
and figure exist only in the mind, it follows that the mind is extended and figured, since 
extension is a mode or attribute which (to speak with the Schools) is predicated of the subject in 
which it exists.”130 He responds to this objection, “I answer, those qualities are in the mind only 
as they are perceived by it, that is, not by way of mode or attribute, but only by way of idea.”131 
Cummins rightly notes that “the crucial words are ‘qualities are in the mind only as they are 
 
127 Van Iten, “Berkeley’s Analysis of Mind,” 376. 
128 Van Iten, 376.  
129 Cummins, “Berkeley on Minds and Agency,” 215. 
130 Berkeley, Principles, Main Text ¶49. 
131 Berkeley, ¶49.  
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perceived by it.”132 The way out of the conundrum is that Berkeley is offering an alternative 
manner in which a substance supports its qualities. “As a quality is in the mind only by way of 
idea, that is, only as being perceived by that mind,” Cummins comments, “there is no basis for 
predicating it of the mind as there would be were being perceived interpreted as inhering in.”133 
In other words, Berkeley is toying with the fundamental concept of what it is to be a substance. 
In so doing, Berkeley resolves the tension between the need to have a support for ideas and the 
traditional implications of that support being a substance.  
PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 
Introductory notes to “Philosophy of Mind” 
Philosophy of mind is a broad field of study, including everything from classic questions 
(such as the mind/body problem) to recent developments (such as incorporating advances in 
quantum theory). In “Spirits and Epistemology,” we have specifically addressed the Berkeleyan 
answer to the question of the knowledge of spirits.134 Before concluding, I want to place idealism 
within the broader framework of leading philosophies of mind today. I will do this using a 
hypothetical which I am calling the ‘question of worlds.’ This question speaks specifically to the 
role of substance in determining one’s philosophical camp. Traditionally, questions of substance 
within philosophy of mind fall under the ‘mind/body problem.’135 This is a large category; as 
Alva Noë notes, “There isn’t a mind/body problem – there are many mind/body problems.” 136 
 
132 Cummins, “Berkeley on Minds and Agency,” 216.  
133 Cummins, 216. 
134 See Alva Noë’s interview on “What is the Mind-Body Problem,” Closer to Truth, 
https://www.closertotruth.com/series/what-the-mind-body-problem, 3’ 30” mark.  
135 For a brief recapitulation of the mind/body problem as it stands today, see the first five pages of Jaegwon Kim, 
“The Mind-Body Problem after Fifty Years,” Current Issues in Philosophy of Mind, Royal Institute of Philosophy 
Supplement 43, ed. Anthony O’Hear (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 3-21.  
136 Noë, https://www.closertotruth.com/series/what-the-mind-body-problem, 0’ 45” mark.  
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Of these mind/body problems, I am choosing to address the question of the difference of 
substance between the mind and the body. 
The Question of Worlds 
In this hypothetical, the question of first importance is how many worlds exist. In this 
context, a world is a full set of objects and their operations. An object is something which can act 
or be acted upon (like a rock with potential momentum or a golf club in full swing). An 
operation designates that thing or things which a given object can do: the golf club might swing, 
the car might move forward, and the rock might fall downhill. Functionally, the distinction 
between an object and an operation is like nouns and verbs. One of them sets the stage for 
something to happen (an airplane), the other denotes the thing that does happen (to fly). Consider 
the terms “world,” “object,” and “operation” to be our working vocabulary. 
A car is a fairly clean example of what I mean by a world. Why? Because it looks to 
operate independently of anything outside of itself. It has hoses, a transmission, an engine, a vast 
number of fluids, and all sorts of other mechanical and aesthetic components. Built perfectly, a 
car will virtually run on its own. Nonetheless, a car is not a perfect example of a world because it 
also needs a host of outside factors to make it drive. Refueling, regular maintenance, and a good 
mechanic, to name a few, are essential to a car’s functioning. A car is like a world in the sense 
that it looks to function independent of anything besides itself; a car is not a world because it 
does not fully succeed in this aim. Speaking technically, a car is not a world because it cannot 
singularly describe its own existence. To answer “what is a car” takes the introduction of items 
which are not the car itself. The fuel comes in from outside the vehicle; likewise, for 
maintenance and many other components throughout the car’s lifetime. This explanatory issue 
continues in a branching fashion for each item on which the car depends. The car needs a 
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manufacturer; the manufacturer needs employees; the employees need housing; housing requires 
real estate; etc.  
At some point, however, it can reasonably be expected that this line of dependence will 
stop, and we will be left with the conglomerate whole. Each operation in our conglomerate will 
work on some object within the system and each object’s properties will be explained by other 
operations and objects. In this conglomerate, no explanatory gaps will remain; each piece will be 
fully explained. Critically, each piece will be fully explained by the other pieces within this 
conglomerate – within the whole, no outside help is needed in any form to explain any of its 
components. To make a short resume of this hypothetical: there are worlds (explanatorily 
complete sets of objects and operations), objects (the “nouns,” or things that can act or be acted 
upon in some manner), and operations (the “verbs,” or actions done by and to the objects). To 
return to the question asked at the start of this experiment: how many worlds exist?  
Conceptually, I can imagine that the world which includes the car and manufacturer 
exists without excluding the thought that some other world exists. An implied bit of the 
definition of a world is this: that were two worlds to exist, they must exist in a perfectly never-
the-twain-shall-meet fashion. The relationship between these two existing worlds must be 
precisely that the two relate in no way whatsoever; if they connect even marginally, we have one 
big world, not two small worlds. For Berkeley, there is only one world. His inseparability 
argument would be aimed, in this hypothetical, at demonstrating that there is only one 
explanatorily complete set of objects and operations. When broken down, Berkeley would say, 
even Locke’s ingenious distinctions between primary and secondary qualities demonstrate there 
to be only one world, the mental world. This claim is significant because it clearly marks the 
break between idealism and its two chief competitors, dualism (in its various forms) and 
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physicalism (in its various forms). Berkeley plays an intriguing role between these philosophies 
of mind. Both idealism and physicalism are monistic; meaning, at metaphysical rock-bottom, 
they posit only one kind of substance. Dualisms are dualistic; meaning, at metaphysical rock-
bottom, there are two kinds of stuff – yet, one of these kinds of stuff (the substance of mind) 
looks significantly more like Berkeley’s substance than does the single kind of substance of his 
monistic counterpart. Additionally, Berkeley manages, through the introduction of ideas as the 
objects of human knowledge, to hold onto dualism’s assertion that there are two kinds of existing 
things. In a word, Berkeley takes on pieces of each competitor’s philosophy and, in my 
estimation, crafts a monism that retains the benefits both of dualisms and monisms.  
Dualism and the question of worlds 
One must be careful in understanding the dualist’s assertion that there are two kinds of 
stuff. “It is important,” writes Lowe, “not to confuse ‘substance’ in this sense with ‘substance’ 
understood as denoting some kind of stuff, such as water or iron.”137 In this context, “a 
substance… is to be understood, quite simply, as any sort of persisting object or thing which is 
capable of undergoing changes in its properties over time.”138 Put otherwise, a substance is “that 
which exists independently as an objective entity. A substance, such as a dog, is thus 
distinguished from a property, such as the dog’s color, which must be possessed or owned by a 
substance.”139 The simplified rationale of dualism is this: that on analysis, there seem to be two 
substances which are capable of undergoing change in properties over time. The one is physical 
substance and the other is mental substance.  
 
137 Lowe, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind, 9.  
138 Lowe, 9.  
139 C. S. Evans, Pocket dictionary of apologetics & philosophy of religion (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 
2002), 111.  
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In other words, the dualist answers the question of worlds by positing two worlds. One of 
these worlds is the full set of mental objects and their operations and the other is the full set of 
physical objects and their operations. For Descartes, the quintessential dualist, the logic 
underlying the claim that there must be two substances (not just one) is that there are two 
explanatorily separate realms of reality, the mental and the physical.140 In Cartesian terminology, 
we have two substances, mind and body, which are fully separate. Thus, applying dualism back 
to the question of worlds, we see that there are two worlds, one mental and one bodily, which 
exist as separate sets of objects (physical objects and mental objects, like baseballs and 
decisions) and operations (like throwing baseball and choosing an entrée).  
The problem for dualism is causation. The physical world does not seem explanatorily 
complete without accounting for the influence of mental activity. I tied my shoes, I chose to run, 
and I ran through a thicket along the way, getting briars and burs all over my socks. Must not I 
account for the choice to tie my shoes, the choice to run, and the choice of running path to 
explain the briars and burrs on my socks? Lowe comments on the interaction problem, “The 
alleged conceptual difficulties centre upon the contention that we cannot really make sense of 
there being causal transactions between items as radically different in nature from one another as 
the dualist conceives mental and physical states to be.”141 If the two worlds interact, it seems we 
have one big world instead of two. The problem of causal interactions between worlds is the 
ultimate problem for dualism and has caused many to look elsewhere for an answer to the 
question of worlds. Is there a way to retain the explanatory advantage of having two substances 
 
140 See Rene Descartes, Meditations, Book II, trans. Elizabeth Haldance and G. R. T. Ross, in Great Books of the 
Western World 31: Descartes and Spinoza, ed. Robert Maynard Hutchins, (Chicago: William Benton, 1952) 81.  
141 Lowe, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind, 21.  
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while avoiding the causality problem? Berkeley’s idealism may offer a way forward – we will 
discuss this momentarily.  
Physicalism and the question of worlds 
The physicalist’s suggestion is that if having two worlds gives us trouble, perhaps there is 
only one world. In this case, the one world is described as something purely physical; that is, the 
physicalist is positing that beneath everything there is a bedrock of physical something. Each 
object and operation are physical. The physicalist position sounds already like what Berkeley 
argues against in the Principles and Dialogues. To a great extent, this is true; bear in mind, 
however, that there are key distinctions between the “physicalism” of Locke, which is usually 
called Lockean atomism, and today’s physicalism.142 Atomism is technically a type of 
materialism (which in turn is normally cast as a type of physicalism). Materialism is “the view 
that only material objects exist;” physicalism differs in that they also “accept the existence of 
matter and energy.”143, 144 For our present purposes, these distinctions are superficial. At heart, 
atomism, materialism, and physicalism (no matter the chosen term) indicate the proposition that 
rather than two worlds, there is one world – and in this world, the bedrock characteristic of all 
things (apparently ‘mental’ things included) is physicality. The ultimate problem for these views 
is that they do not satisfactorily explain the mental. Thus, Howell’s book (see footnote 142 
above); explaining consciousness and other distinctly mental phenomena is difficult for the 
ardent physicalist. As Noë puts it, “it saddens me to have to say that very little progress has been 
 
142 See Howell, Robert J., Consciousness and the Limits of Objectivity: The Case for Subjective Physicalism, Oxford 
University Press (Oxford: 2013). Howell’s work is a fascinating approach to resolving current difficulties within the 
physicalist camp on philosophy of mind and, along the way, clearly presents the traditional physicalist view(s).  
143 C. S. Evans, Pocket dictionary of apologetics & philosophy of religion (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 
2002), 92. 
144 C. S. Evans, 73.  
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made in neuroscience on these questions;”145 these questions being what it is to have 
consciousness and mental activity in a purely physical world.  
Idealism and the question of worlds 
As idealism connects to both… 
As mentioned, Berkeley finds a sort of middle ground between dualism and physicalism. 
He finds this middle ground in that he takes on important characteristics of both philosophies. 
From dualism, he takes on the reality of mental activity. He does not, like the physicalist, try to 
reduce mentality to something seemingly nonmental (physical matter). He also, like the dualist, 
recognizes the need for having two sorts of existing things (minds and ideas) but differs in that 
only mind is a substance whereas dualism posits mental substance and physical substance. From 
physicalism, he takes on that there is only one substance. Importantly, he also takes on the 
reductionist aspect of physicalism; meaning, the physicalist holds that everything can be reduced 
in one sense or another to a single substance. Berkeley differs in that his substance is mind, not 
matter – yet, this reductionist tendency is critical to his thought.146  
Dualistic issues that idealism resolves… 
In positing two substances, the dualist clears up some notable issues regarding mental and 
physical properties. Chief among these issues is that pains and microwaves seem to be two very 
different sorts of things. The dualist position carries explanatory power in its ability to simply 
say that pains belong to mental substance and microwaves belong to physical substance. 
However, as mentioned already, the dualist position struggles heavily in regard to causality. How 
 
145 Alva Noë, “What is the Mind-Body Problem,” 10’ 12” mark.  
146 Refer, for example, to the aforementioned inseparability argument. Even more obviously in the Dialogues than 
in the Principles, Berkeley makes hay out of reducing Locke’s material substance into his mental substance, 
primarily by demonstrating that his mental substance explains everything about Locke’s material substance – and, 
therefore, Locke’s material substance (and its supposed ‘primary’ qualities) does not exist.  
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does a change in mental substance (the pain I experience on stubbing my toe) cause a change in 
physical substance (the “Ow!” I yell in response)? On a cost-benefit analysis, dualism is 
generally disregarded by philosophers today; the issue of causation seems a bigger detractor than 
dualism’s explanatory power is a positive.147 The real hero of the story would be a philosophy 
that can retain the ability to speak of two types of existing things and avoid the issue of causality.  
I hold that idealism is this philosophy. Where the division between mental and physical 
substance causes problems for the dualist, idealism enjoy a simpler explanation of causation: 
both the pain I experience on stubbing my toe and the Ow! I yell in response have their roots in 
the same substance – mind.148 In short, there is no problem of causation because the issue rests 
on having two kinds of substance and idealism only has one. Berkeley’s idealism also retains the 
explanatory power of the ‘two things’ of dualism. Within idealism, there are minds and ideas 
OHK. Only mind is a substance, but for reasons already discussed at length, we retain a second 
sort of existing stuff. As such, idealism keeps the ability to speak of two kinds of existing things, 
putting it in the unique position of at once claiming dualism’s explanatory power and the 
monistic ability to disband the problem of causality.  
Monistic issues that idealism resolves… 
One further difficulty for monisms is their need to separates themselves one from the 
next. Each is claiming that there is only one substance, so no immediate distinction appears 
between, say, idealism and physicalism. As explored in, “Two Outstanding Questions,” Berkeley 
must define ‘mind’ carefully so as to avoid crafting arguments that could just as well support the 
case of material substance. Berkeley’s is not the only monism to need clarity on account of 
 
147 See, for furthers on dualism’s perennial issues, Chapter I: “A Dozen Problems in the Philosophy of Mind” in 
Searle, Mind.   
148 Berkeley, Principles, Main Text ¶135.  
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definitions. We will presently address physicalism since, at this point in time, it is the most 
widely held monism in philosophy of mind.149  
Howell makes note of a serious problem of definition for physicalism in his 
Consciousness and the Limits of Objectivity: The Case for Subjective Physicalism. In Chapter II: 
“The Base Problem,” he directly confronts the difficulty of defining the physical. This problem is 
especially grave because without a proper definition of the physical, physicalism cannot hope to 
get off the ground. Howell identifies four problems which make it rather difficult to arrive at a 
satisfactory definition.  
The first problem is that you cannot define the physical simply by saying that it is not 
mental.150 This does not define the physical – nor does it define the mental which the physical is 
not. “It would be far preferable,” writes Howell, “to have a definition that said what physical 
properties are, rather than what they are not – is there really a unified nature shared by all things 
not mental, unlike the nature shared by things that are not cucumbers?”151 The second problem is 
that you cannot define the physical by saying that it is the kind of stuff discovered by X 
method.152 This would put us in the troubling position deciding whether what was discovered by 
the methods of Galileo or the methods of Einstein is really physical – obviously, we would like 
to say that they both discovered something physical. The third problem is that you cannot define 
the physical by saying that it is like collection X.153 Howell remarks, “One might be inclined to 
say that things are physical if they are sufficiently similar to ‘that stuff’ where a sufficiently 
 
149 Reference, for confirmation of physicalism’s predominance in the field, Searle, Mind, 12. Note that Searle uses 
the term ‘materialism’ to designate what I presently mean by the term ‘physicalism.’ There is a constant debate 
over which terms mean what… but then that is my bigger point presently, regardless. 
150 Howell, Consciousness and the Limits of Objectivity: The Case for Subjective Physicalism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 20.   
151 Howell, 21.  
152 Howell, 18.  
153 Howell, 19.  
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comprehensive sample of dirt, tables, chairs, and unequivocally physical things are 
demonstrated.”154 The issue is that “the fundamental physical properties of the universe probably 
bear little salient resemblance to paradigmatic physical objects. A quark is not much like a 
chair.”155 So, we would again have to decide whether one group (fundamental physical 
properties) or another (paradigmatic physical objects) is physical – and, obviously, we would 
like to say that they both are. Finally, the fourth problem is that you cannot define the physical 
by saying that it is the stuff or type of stuff studied by physics.156 Howell clarifies that in this 
case “Either the definition proceeds in terms of what is countenanced by current physics or it 
proceeds in terms of what would be acknowledged by some future, perhaps completed physics. If 
the former, physicalism is surely false since current physics is almost certainly incomplete. If the 
latter, however, it is hard to give content to the notion since no one knows what a future physics 
will look like.”157  
These are not small problems. How, if one cannot define the physical, is it appropriate to 
claim that the universe is physical? This seems a hollow argument indeed. Descartes first 
encountered this problem when he defined to be material as “to be extended in space.”158 Howell 
comments, “The Cartesian definition of the physical failed in part because the progress of the 
physical sciences led us to see that very strange things, such as electrons, quarks, and fields, 
make up the physical world.”159 Just as for Descartes, so for today’s physicalism: the problem of 
defining the physical remains.  
 
154 Howell, Consciousness and the Limits of Objectivity, 19.  
155 Howell, 19.  
156 Howell, 15.  
157 Howell, 16.  
158 Howell, 14.  
159 Howell, 15.  
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So, what does this say to the viability of idealism? Does idealism have a similar issue or 
set of issues, being itself a monism? Referencing the discussion of “Spirits and Epistemology,” it 
is fair to claim that idealism is clearer in its definitions of idea and of mind that physicalism is in 
its definition of physical. It is given, then, that idealism holds at least an equally viable position 
as physicalism. Although there is not space to properly make this argument, idealism’s ability to 
define its fundamentals in contrast to physicalism’s (at least seeming) inability indicates that 
idealism may even achieve a higher place yet than its monistic competitor.160   
BRIEF CONCLUDING WORD 
Idealism, of course, comes with its own set of issues. Over the years, Berkeley’s idealism 
has been refashioned by many other philosophers. Some of these idealisms have so far diverged 
from Berkeley that they merit names besides Berkeleyan idealism. Among these, we find 
mereological idealism, causal idealism, and conceptual idealism.161, 162, 163 It also bears 
mentioning that scholarship on idealism is not limited to Berkeley. There are significant strains 
of idealism in Jewish thought and in Buddhist thought, to name two alternate sources. Even 
within the Berkeleyan tradition of idealism, there are philosophers branching into realms that 
Berkeley would never have touched. Hellen Yetter-Chappell, for example, writes an article 
entitled, “Idealism Without God.”164 This paper has not sustained any real discussion of the 
 
160 The cited book of Howell’s (Consciousness and the Limits of Objectivity) is an attempt to straighten out the 
difficulty of defining the physical. I supremely enjoyed his work to this end and would love, if time permits 
someday, to write of how similar his physicalism becomes to Berkeley’s idealism before he reaches a satisfying 
definition of the physical.  
161 For mereological idealism: Kenneth Pearce, “Mereological Idealism,” Idealism: New Essays in Metaphysics, ed. 
Tyron Goldschmidt and Kenneth Pearce (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 200-216.  
162 For causal idealism: Sarah Bernstein, “Causal Idealism,” Idealism: New Essays in Metaphysics, ed. Tyron 
Goldschmidt and Kenneth Pearce (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 217-230.  
163 For conceptual idealism: Thomas Hofweber, “Conceptual Idealism Without Ontological Idealism,” Idealism: New 
Essays in Metaphysics, ed. Tyron Goldschmidt and Kenneth Pearce (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 124-
141.  
164 Hellen Yetter-Chappell, “Idealism Without God,” Idealism: New Essays in Metaphysics, ed. Tyron Goldschmidt 
and Kenneth Pearce (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 66-81. 
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importance of God in Berkeleyan idealism but suffice to say: God is of fundamental importance 
to Berkeley’s idealism. One of the chief impetuses for Berkeley’s idealism is that it allows him 
to argue for a universe that depends intricately and constantly on God for its existence and 
operation.165 That there could be an idealism without God represents just how far scholarship on 
idealism has branched from Berkeley’s own philosophy.  
In any case, I believe it is clear that on investigation, idealism is a strong philosophical 
contender in today’s world, especially in the philosophy of mind and self. I recognize that this 
paper only touches the surfaces of many deep and difficult subjects. It would be false to pretend 
that we have discussed even the first quarter of any of the subjects approached, and it bears 
mentioning that idealism has many features that have not gotten even the slightest treatment. The 
role of God in Berkeleyan idealism, for example, and Berkeley’s philosophy of vision are two 
important pieces of his philosophy that have fallen by the wayside for reasons of length. By 
housing the discussion within Berkeley’s Principles, we have regardless made an excellent foray 
into the heart of his philosophy. To conclude without bedraggling the issue: Berkeley’s idealism 
shows itself to be far from dead and a worthy philosophy in many fields, notably the philosophy 
of mind. The great gadfly of 18th century philosophy remains today as adept a philosopher as 
ever and merits the attention of all who read him.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
165 Berkeley, Principles, Main Text ¶156.  
P a g e  | 56 
 
Bibliography 
 
 
Berkeley, George. A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge. In George 
Berkeley: Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues between Hylas and 
Philonous, edited by Roger Woolhouse, 31-113. New York: Penguin Books, 1988.  
 
Berkeley, George. A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge. In Berkeley: 
Philosophical Writings, edited by Desmond M. Clarke, 67-150. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008. 
 
Berkeley, George. The Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous. In George Berkeley: 
Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, 
edited by Roger Woolhouse, 115-208. New York: Penguin Books, 1988.  
 
Berkeley, George. Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous. In Berkeley: Philosophical 
Writings, edited by Desmond M. Clarke, 151-242. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008. 
 
Berman, David, “Berkeley’s Life and Works,” in The Cambridge Philosophy to Berkeley, edited 
by Kenneth P. Winkler, 13-33. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
 
Bernstein, Sarah. “Causal Idealism,” Idealism: New Essays in Metaphysics, edited by Tyron 
Goldschmidt and Kenneth Pearce, 217-230. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017.  
 
Cummins, Phillip D. “Berkeley on Minds and Agency,” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Berkeley, edited by Kenneth P. Winkler, 190-229. New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005. 
 
Descartes, Meditations. In Encyclopedia Britannica: Great Books of the Western World, edited 
by Robert Maynard Hutchins. Chicago: William Benton, 1952.  
 
Downing, Lisa, “2.2.1 The Master Argument?” in “George Berkeley,” The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming 
URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/berkeley/>. 
 
Evans, C. Stephen. Pocket Dictionary of Apologetics & Philosophy of Religion. Downers Grove, 
IL: InterVarsity Press, 2002.  
 
Fields, Keota. Berkeley: Ideas, Immaterialism, and Objective Presence. Lanham, MD: Lexington 
Books, 2011.  
 
Flage, Daniel E., "Berkeley's Notions." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45, no. 3 
(1985): 407-425. Accessed March 15, 2020, DOI: 10.2307/2107273. 
 
P a g e  | 57 
 
Fogelin, Robert J. Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Berkeley and the Principles of Human 
Knowledge. New York: Routledge, 2001. 
 
Furlong, E. J., “An Ambiguity in Berkeley’s ‘Principles.’” Hermathena (Trinity College Dublin), 
no. 94 (July 1960): 84-102.  
 
Grayling, A. C. “Berkeley’s Argument for Immaterialism.” In The Cambridge Companion to 
Berkeley, edited by Kenneth P. Winkler, 166-189. New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005.  
 
Hofweber, Thomas. “Conceptual Idealism Without Ontological Idealism.” In Idealism: New 
Essays in Metaphysics, edited by Tyron Goldschmidt and Kenneth Pearce, 124-141. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2017. 
 
Howell, Robert J., Consciousness and the Limits of Objectivity: The Case for Subjective 
Physicalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.  
 
Jesseph, Douglas M. “Berkeley’s Philosophy of Mathematics.” In The Cambridge Companion to 
Berkeley, edited by Kenneth P. Winkler, 266-310. New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005.   
 
Kim, Jaegwon, “The Mind-Body Problem after Fifty Years,” Current Issues in Philosophy of 
Mind (Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 43), edited by Anthony O’Hear, 3-21. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.  
 
Kochiras, Hylarie, “3.1 Tension in Locke’s Thought,” in “Locke’s Philosophy of Science,” The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), 
forthcoming URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/locke-
philosophy-science/>. 
 
Lowe, E. J., An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2000.  
 
Nadler, Steven. “Berkeley’s Ideas and the Primary/Secondary Distinction,” Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy, 20, no. 1 (1990), 47-61. Accessed March 15, 2020. 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/40231683. 
 
Noë, Alva. “What is the Mind-Body Problem.” Closer to Truth. Accessed February 5, 2020. 
https://www.closertotruth.com/series/what-the-mind-body-problem. 
 
Pearce, Kenneth. “Mereological Idealism.” In Idealism: New Essays in Metaphysics, edited by 
Tyron Goldschmidt and Kenneth Pearce, 200-216. New York: Oxford University Press, 
2017.  
 
Roberts, John Russel. A Metaphysics for the Mob: The Philosophy of George Berkeley. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
P a g e  | 58 
 
 
Searle, John R. Mind: a brief introduction (Fundamentals of Philosophy Series). New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2004.  
 
Stoneham, Tom. “George Berkeley: A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human 
Knowledge.” In Central Works of Philosophy Vol. 2: Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
Centuries, 136-166. Chesham: Acumen Publishing Limited, 2005.  
 
Van Iten, Richard J., “Berkeley’s Analysis of Mind,” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research (International Phenomenological Society) 24, no. 3 (1964): 375-382.  
 
Wright, Crispin, “Self-Knowledge: the Wittgensteinian Legacy,” Current Issues in Philosophy of 
Mind (Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 43), edited by Anthony O’Hear, 101-
122. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.  
 
Yetter-Chappell, Hellen. “Idealism Without God.” In Idealism: New Essays in Metaphysics, 
edited by Tyron Goldschmidt and Kenneth Pearce, 66-81. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2017.   
  
